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ABSTRACT
The high bar of proof to demonstrate either a disparate treatment or disparate
impact cause of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, coupled with the “black box”
nature of many automated hiring systems, renders the detection and redress of bias in such
algorithmic systems difficult. This Article, with contributions at the intersection of
administrative law, employment & labor law, and law & technology, makes the central
claim that the automation of hiring both facilitates and obfuscates employment discrimination.
That phenomenon and the deployment of intellectual property law as a shield against the
scrutiny of automated systems combine to form an insurmountable obstacle for disparate
impact claimants.
To ensure against the identified “bias in, bias out” phenomenon associated with
automated decision-making, I argue that the employer’s affirmative duty of care as posited by
other legal scholars creates “an auditing imperative” for algorithmic hiring systems. This
auditing imperative mandates both internal and external audits of automated hiring systems,
as well as record-keeping initiatives for job applications. Such audit requirements have
precedent in other areas of law, as they are not dissimilar to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) audits in labor law or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act audit
requirements in securities law.
I also propose that employers that have subjected their automated hiring platforms
to external audits could receive a certification mark, “the Fair Automated Hiring Mark,”
which would serve to positively distinguish them in the labor market. Labor law mechanisms
such as collective bargaining could be an effective approach to combating the bias in automated
hiring by establishing criteria for the data deployed in automated employment decision-making
and creating standards for the protection and portability of said data. The Article concludes
by noting that automated hiring, which captures a vast array of applicant data, merits greater
legal oversight given the potential for “algorithmic blackballing,” a phenomenon that could
continue to thwart many applicants’ future job bids.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: A woman seeking a retail job is informed that the
job can only be applied for online. The position is a sales clerk for a retail
company with store hours from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM. She is interested in the
morning and afternoon hours, as she has children who are in school until 3:00
PM. When completing the application, she reaches a screen where she is
prompted to register her hours of availability. She enters 9:00 AM to 3:00 PM,
Monday through Friday. However, when she hits the button to advance to the
next screen, she receives an error message indicating that she has not
completed the current section. She refreshes her screen, she re-starts her
computer, and still the same error message remains. Finally, in frustration, she
abandons the application. Compare the above to this second scenario: A fiftythree-year-old man is applying for a job that requires a college degree. But
when he attempts to complete the application online, he finds that the dropdown menu offers only college graduation dates that go back to the year 2000.
The automated hiring platform will, in effect, exclude many applicants who are
older than forty years old. If the man also chooses to forgo the application like
the woman in the previous scenario, the automated hiring system may not
retain any record of the two failed attempts to complete the job application.1
The vignettes above reflect the real-life experiences of job applicants who
must now contend with automated hiring systems in their bid for
employment. 2 These stories illustrate the potential for automated hiring
systems to discreetly and disproportionately cull the applications of job seekers
who are from legally protected classes. 3 Given that legal scholars have
identified a “bias in, bias out” problem for automated decision-making, 4
automated hiring as a socio-technical trend challenges the American bedrock
ideal of equal opportunity in employment,5 as such automated practices may
not only be deployed to exclude certain categories of workers but may also be
See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).
2 Patricia G. Barnes, Behind the Scenes, Discrimination by Job Search Engines, AGE
DISCRIMINATION EMP. (Mar. 29, 2017),
https://www.agediscriminationinemployment.com/tag/illinois-attorney-general-lisamadigan/ [https://perma.cc/6H7Z-WSDD]; Ifeoma Ajunwa & Daniel Greene, Platforms at
Work: Data Intermediaries in the Organization of the Workplace, in WORK AND LABOR IN THE
DIGITAL AGE (2019) (discussing the encountered difficulty of completing an online
application when applying with constrained hours of availability).
3 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 guarantees equal opportunity in employment
irrespective of race, gender, and other protected characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e17 (2000).
4 See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2224 (2019) (arguing that the
problem of disparate impact in predictive risk algorithms lies not in the algorithmic system
but in the nature of prediction itself); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 58 (2019) (noting the bias that exists within AI systems and
arguing for private mechanisms to govern AI systems); Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms,
69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 87 (2017) (“This new family of algorithms hold enormous promise,
but also poses new and unusual dangers.”).
5 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2; see also Pauline Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 860 (2017) [hereinafter Data-Driven Discrimination at Work].
1
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used to justify the inclusion of other classes as more “fit” for the job.6 This is
a cause for the legal concern that algorithms may be used to manipulate the
labor market in ways that negate equal employment opportunity.7 This concern
is further exacerbated given that nearly all Fortune 500 companies now use
algorithmic recruitment and hiring tools.8 Algorithmic hiring has also saturated
the low-wage retail market, with the top twenty Fortune 500 companies, which
are mostly retail and commerce companies that boast large numbers of
employees, almost exclusively hiring through online platforms.9
Although it is undeniable that there could be tangible economic benefits
of adopting automated decision-making, 10 the received wisdom of the
objectivity of automated decision-making, coupled with an unquestioning
acceptance of the results of algorithmic decision-making,11 have allowed hiring
systems to proliferate without adequate legal oversight. As Professor Margot
Kaminski notes, addressing algorithmic decision-making concerns requires
both individual and systemic approaches. 12 Currently, the algorithmic
decisions made in the private sector are largely unregulated, and Kaminski
argues for a collaborative approach to governance that could satisfy both
individual and collective concerns:
Collaborative governance is a middle ground, a third way, that aims to
harness the benefits of self-regulation without its pitfalls. The government
stays significantly involved as a backdrop threat to nudge private sector
involvement, as a forum for convening and empowering conflicting voices,
as an arbiter or certifier in the name of the public interest, and as a hammer
that can come down to enforce compliance.13
Thus, the goal of this Article is neither to argue against or for the use of
automated decision-making in employment, nor is it to examine whether
automated hiring systems are better than humans at making hiring decisions.
For antidiscrimination law, the efficacy of any particular hiring system is a
secondary concern to ensuring that any such system does not unlawfully

See Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV.
1671, 1671 (2020).
7 See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 996, 999 (2014);
Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 165 (2017); Tal Z.
Zarsky, Privacy and Manipulation in the Digital Age, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 157, 158,
160–61 (2019); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation:
Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 2, 10 (2019); Pauline Kim,
Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV. 867, 869 (2020).
8 LINDA BARBER, INST. FOR EMP. STUD., E-RECRUITMENT DEVELOPMENTS 3 (2006).
9 Ajunwa & Greene, supra note 2, at 71–72.
10 See infra Section I.A.
11 See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1684–85.
12 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic
Accountability, 92 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2019).
13 Id. at 1561.
6
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discriminate against protected categories. 14 Therefore, my aim is to suggest
collaborative regulatory regimes for automated hiring systems that will ensure
that any benefits of automated hiring are not negated by (un)intended
outcomes, such as unlawful discrimination on the basis of protected
characteristics.
Furthermore, this Article owes a debt to Professor Katherine Strandburg,
who notes that explainability has important normative and practical
implications for system design.15 Specifically, Strandburg notes that inscrutable
decision tools disrupt the explanatory flows among the multiple actors
responsible for determining goals, selecting decision criteria, and applying
those criteria.16 Thus, seeking the explainability of automated decisions is not
just for the benefit of the decision subjects, but really for the benefit of all
interested in the outcomes.17
In a similar vein, Talia Gillis and Josh Simons have argued against focusing
on accountability of individual actors.18 Rather, they note that “[t]he focus on
individual, technical explanations . . . [is] driven by an uncritical bent towards
transparency.”19 Instead, they advocate that “[i]nstitutions should justify their
choices about the design and integration of machine learning models not to
individuals, but to empowered regulators or other forms of public oversight
bodies.” 20
Furthermore, Professor Pauline Kim makes the case that the law does
allow for the revision of algorithmic systems to address bias.21 Thus, she argues
that the law permits using auditing to detect and correct for discriminatory
bias.22 Kim argues that auditing should be an important strategy for examining
whether the outcomes of automated hiring systems comport with equal
opportunity in employment guidelines.23
The insights of these legal scholars and others24 form the foundation for
my contribution in this Article, in which I posit an auditing imperative for
As Professor Charles Sullivan notes: “[T]he antidiscrimination statutes don’t really care
whether any particular selection device actually improves productivity so long as it does not
discriminate.” Charles Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 398 (2018).
15 Katherine Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L.
REV. 1851, 1867–72 (2019).
16 See id. at 1851.
17 See id. at 1857–58; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Daniel N. Kluttz & Nitin Kohli, Shaping
Our Tools: Contestability as a Means to Promote Responsible Algorithmic Decision Making in the
Professions, in AFTER THE DIGITAL TORNADO (Kevin Werbach ed., 2020).
18 See Talia Gillis & Josh Simons, Explanation < Justification: GDPR and the Perils of Privacy, 2
J.L. & INNOVATION 71 (2019).
19 Id. at 76.
20 Id. at 81.
21 Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 189, 191
(2017) [hereinafter Auditing Algorithms] (responding to Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey,
Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan
Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017)).
22 See id. at 197–99.
23 See id. at 202.
24 See Bryan Casey, Ashkon Farhangi & Roland Vogl, Rethinking Explainable Machines: The
GDPR’s “Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34
14
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automated hiring systems. Building on Professor Kim’s essay, I argue not just
that the law allows for the audits, but that the spirit of antidiscrimination law
requires it. That is, I follow the footsteps of legal scholars like Professors
Richard Thompson Ford, 25 James Grimmelmann, 26 Robert Post, 27 David
Benjamin Oppenheimer, 28 and Noah Zatz, 29 to argue that employment
antidiscrimination law imposes an affirmative duty of care on employers to
ensure that they are avoiding practices that would constrain equal opportunity
in employment. Thus, I argue, that when employers choose to use algorithmic
systems, fulfilling their duty of care entails regular audits of those systems. In
turn, audits necessitate the record-keeping and data retention mandates that I
also propose in this Article.
I note here that automated hiring systems exist in a plethora of forms, with
each iteration presenting distinct legal issues. This is because each form of
automated hiring does not offer the same level of automation. Ranging from
the least automated (which allows for the most human intervention) to the
most automated (which allows for the least human intervention), there are:
applicant tracking systems (“ATS”), which employ algorithms that parse
resumes for keywords;30 machine learning algorithms that could be trained on
selecting resumes and deployed to rank them in hundreds or thousands;31 and
video screening systems, such as HireVue, which provide automated
assessments based on facial analysis and vocal indications. 32 To offer a full
portrait of the proliferation of automated hiring platforms and associated legal
issues, the Appendix offers a survey of extant automated hiring systems in
which I detail a sampling of the companies currently using those systems, as
well as their potentially problematic features. This Article does not delve into
the specific legal issues associated with each iteration of automated hiring
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143, 153–68 (2019). Other scholars have thought about audits in the
GDPR context, but I bring the idea of audits to the American employment and labor law
context.
25 See Richard Thompson Ford, Rethinking Rights after the Second Reconstruction, 132 YALE L.J.
2942 (2014) [hereinafter Rethinking Rights]; see also Richard Thompson Ford, Bias in the Air:
Rethinking Employment Discrimination Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1381 (2014) [hereinafter Bias in
the Air].
26 See James Grimmelmann & Daniel Westreich, Incomprehensible Discrimination,
7 CALIF. L. REV. 164, 171–74 (2017).
27 See Robert Post, 1998–99 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture: Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic
of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 36 (2000).
28 See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993)
[hereinafter "Negligent Discrimination].
29 See Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (2009) [hereinafter
Managing the Macaw].
30 See, e.g., CLEVERSTAFF, https://cleverstaff.net [https://perma.cc/2KBM-5VQH].
31 Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias Against Women,
REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2018, 10:12 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com- jobsautomation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-againstwomen-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/6SA7-R35L] (“[A]mazon’s computer models
were trained to vet applicants by observing patterns in resumes submitted to the company
over a 10-year period. Most came from men, a reflection of male dominance across the tech
industry.”).
32 See HIREVUE, http://hirevue.com [https://perma.cc/QLH3-QXQM].
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system; rather, it recognizes that all job applications share several common
legal problems regardless of which iteration of automated hiring system applies,
and that the greatest obstacle is meeting the standard of proof for employment
discrimination.
But first, consider the growing trend towards automated video interview
assessment as perhaps the most extreme of automated hiring systems.
According to one article, one of the leaders in the automated video interview
market, HireVue, “uses AI to analyze word choice, tone, and facial movement
of job applicants who do video interviews.”33 For some candidates, such video
assessments recall an approach 34 to hiring that is reminiscent of Frederik
Winslow Taylor’s time series experiments on factory workers.35 Relating his
experience with HireVue, one candidate whose answers were interrupted by a
timer noted: “You just see yourself and a stopwatch ticking down.”36 But the
destabilizing effect of timed responses is not the greatest problem associated
with automated video interviewing. As researchers have noted, many of these
systems are trained on white male faces and voices, which poses a problem for
any applicants who diverge from that norm.37 Thus, applicants who are white
women or racial minorities may have their facial expressions or tone of voice
mischaracterized by automated video interviewing platforms.38
Other important concerns raised by critics of automated video
interviewing systems are: the collection of the applicant’s personal data, the
“black box” nature of how such information is used, 39 and a lack of worker’s
agency and control over the portability of the data. As Dan Lyons notes in his
book, Lab Rats:

Richard Feloni, I Tried the Software That Uses AI to Scan Job Applicants for Companies Like
Goldman Sachs and Unilever Before Meeting Them — and It’s Not as Creepy as It Sounds., BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 23, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/hirevue-ai-poweredjob-interview-platform-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/3R8D-Y6QN].
34 See generally FREDERIK WINSLOW TAYLOR, PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911); Cf.Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Joel Ford, Health and Big Data: An Ethical
Framework for Health Information Collection by Corporate Wellness Programs, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
474 (2016) (positing that workforce science, as an iteration of Taylorism, now focuses on the
worker’s body rather than the job task).
35 See, e.g., Rebecca Greenfield, The Rise of the (Truly Awful) Webcam Job Interview, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 12, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-12/the-riseof-the-truly-awful-webcam-job-interview [https://perma.cc/M93J-QTY8].
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Tess Townsend, Most Engineers Are White — and So Are the Faces That They Use to
Train Software, VOX: RECODE (Jan. 18, 2017, 11:45 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2017/1/18/14304964/data-facial-recognition-trouble-recognizingblack-white-faces-diversity [https://perma.cc/HG4C-SEP6] (“A lack of diversity in the
training set leads to an inability to easily characterize faces that do not fit the normal face
derived from the training set.” (emphasis omitted)).
38 See Thor Benson, Your Next Job Interview Could Be with a Racist Bot, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 20,
2018, 11:01 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/your-next-job-interview-could-be-with-aracist-bot [https://perma.cc/QRG3-D3WU].
39 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 16 (2015) (arguing that unregulated and opaque data
collection is contributing to social inequality).
33
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HireVue’s robot recruiting system is building a database of deep, rich
psychographic information on millions of people. Moreover, the data
is not anonymous. Your psychographic blueprint is connected to all of
your personal information — name, address, email, phone number,
work history, education. And they have you on video. Everything you
say in an interview can follow you around for the rest of your life.40
Yet, there are no federal regulations as to the collection, storage, or use of data
from automated hiring platforms, and in effect, employers have carte blanche to
adopt self-serving practices.41
In their seminal essay on privacy law, Samuel D. Warren and Louis L.
Brandeis argue that Americans should have the “right to be let alone.” 42 The
scholars start by writing “[t]hat the individual shall have full protection in
person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but it has been
found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent
of such protection.” 43 Thus, they suggest molding common law to fit the
times — including the political, social, and economic changes that regularly
occur.44 I note here the growing tendency to deny this “right to be let alone”
to workers. Increasingly, workers are being called upon to exchange their
privacy for the mere opportunity to be considered for employment.45 With
recent technological advances in automated hiring, and especially given the
current trend towards automated video interviewing which accumulates even
more data about the candidate’s person than could have previously been
imagined, employment antidiscrimination law is in dire need of updates. In this
Article, I argue that such updates to the law should not just acknowledge the
auditing imperative, but also recognize worker’s agency to control the end uses
and portability of data (much of it now biometric) subsumed by the
algorithmic hiring apparatus.46
In this context, it is alarming that a recent study by the Pew Research
Center found that most Americans underestimate the prevalence of these
automated hiring platforms in the workplace.47 The study revealed that “fewer
DAN LYONS, LAB RATS: HOW SILICON VALLEY MADE WORK MISERABLE FOR THE REST
OF US 181 (2019) (ebook).
40

See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in
the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1160 (2017) (“Despite this interpretive
limitation, machine-learning algorithms have been implemented widely in private-sector
settings. Companies desire the savings in costs and efficiency gleaned from these
techniques.”).
42 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 6 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance, 105 CAL. L.
REV. 735, 736 (2017).
46 See infra Parts III, IV.
47 AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AUTOMATION IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 50 (2017), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2017/10/03151500/PI_2017.10.04_Automation_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4E4-B47W].
41
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than half of Americans are familiar with the concept of computer programs
that can review job applications without any human involvement.”48 In fact,
57% of Americans say that they have heard nothing at all about automated
hiring platforms in the past. 49 Of the respondents who were aware of
automated hiring systems, 76% stated that they would not want to apply for
jobs through such a system.50 The given reasons for that response varied, but
most commonly, the individuals expressed the belief that computer systems
could not capture everything about an applicant. 51 One woman wrote, “[a]
computer cannot measure the emotional intelligence or intangible assets that
many humans have.”52 Another stated, “I do believe that hiring people requires
a fair amount of judgment and intuition that is not well automated.”53 On the
other side of this spectrum, however, 22% of the individuals surveyed reported
that they would want to apply for jobs that use a computer program to make
hiring decisions.54 The most common rationale for this response was the belief
that software would be less biased than human reviewers.55
I have previously argued that a misguided belief in the objectivity of
automated decision-making has ushered in automated hiring as an anti-bias
intervention.56 I have further argued that the framing of discovered bias in
automated decision-making systems as a technical problem, rather than a legal
problem, has stymied attempts at solving the problem. 57 Professor Sandra
Mayson has also argued that “the source of racial inequality in risk assessment
[which is a type of automated decision-making] lies neither in the input data,
nor in a particular algorithm, nor in algorithmic methodology per se.”58 Rather,
“the deep problem is the nature of prediction itself. All prediction looks to the
past to make guesses about future events. In a racially stratified world, any
method of prediction will project the inequalities of the past into the future.”59
For automated decision-making in employment, I argue that not only is the
nature of prediction problematic (particularly given historical employment
discrimination), but also, the manner in which such prediction is accomplished
further creates opportunities for unlawful discrimination and exclusion.
I identify four major problems with automated hiring: 1) the design
features of automated hiring platforms may enable them to serve as culling
systems that discreetly eliminate applicants from protected categories without
retaining a record; 2) automated hiring systems that allow for the deployment
of proxies for protected categories, like gender or race, can be used to present
discriminatory employment results as fair; 3) intellectual property law,
Id.
Id.
50 Id. at 52.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1671.
57 Id.
58 See Mayson, supra note 4, at 2218.
59 Id.
48
49
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specifically trade secret, protects automated hiring systems from outside
scrutiny and allows discrimination to go undetected; and 4) a worker’s lack of
control over the portability of applicant data captured by automated hiring
systems increases the chance of repeated employment discrimination, thus
raising the specter of an algorithmically permanently excluded class60 of job
applicants, meaning that certain applicants might find themselves
“algorithmically blackballed.”61
When it comes to litigation to redress employment discrimination, these
problematic features of automated hiring present obstacles to workers: 1) At
higher levels of automation, it becomes difficult to determine intent to
discriminate, which is required for finding liability under the disparate
treatment cause of action under Title VII;62 2) when bringing suit under the
disparate impact cause of action, the design features of automated hiring
systems, as well as trade secret claims that may arise, impede the plaintiff’s
ability to provide the statistical proof required to establish a prima facie case;
and 3) litigation remedies in employment antidiscrimination law do not address
privacy and discrimination issues associated with the collection of personal and
biometric data from job candidates, as enabled by automated video
interviewing. I argue then that employment law, with its emphasis on litigation
as redress for employment discrimination, is limited in its capacity to address
the full spectrum of identified problems with automated hiring.
This Article pushes the boundaries of existing employment law scholarship
by proposing alternative approaches to solving the issue of bias in automated
employment decision-making, in addition to offering methods for
strengthening existing litigation redress mechanisms. Alternative approaches
to litigation represent an important contribution given that employment
discrimination plaintiffs generally do not fare well in court. 63 Thus, I argue that
Richard A. Bales & Katherine V.W. Stone, The Invisible Web at Work: Artificial Intelligence and
Electronic Surveillance in the Workplace, 41 BERKELEY J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 1 (2020) (“The data
collected is transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a permanent
electronic resume that can identify and predict an individual’s performance as well as their
work ethic, personality, union proclivity, employer loyalty, and future health care costs.”).
61 See infra Section IV.C.4.
62 Charles Sullivan, Employing AI, 63 VILL. L. REV. 395, 397 (2018) (exploring the legal
difficulties of assigning intent to a machine learning automated hiring system, when the
machine can learn from previous decisions and write its own follow-on models).
63 See Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1944 (2004) (“The 5.8% reversal rate of
defendant trial victories is smaller in employment discrimination cases than any other
category of cases except prisoner habeas corpus trials.”); see also Ruth Colker, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 99, 100 n.9 (1999)
(finding that between 1992 and 1998, defendants prevailed in more than 92% of cases
decided at the trial court level and were more likely to be affirmed on appeal); Theodore
Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J.
1567, 1578 (1989) (noting that only claims filed by prisoners have a lower success rate than
that of employment discrimination plaintiffs); cf. Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment
Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 938
(2014) (“Employment discrimination law has long been ripe for updating. Many of the core
cases regarding how discrimination is defined and proved arose in the 1970s in a very
different era and were designed to address very different kinds of discrimination.”).
60
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administrative measures, such as mandated audits, are necessary and currently
under-utilized means for achieving the bedrock legal principle of equal
opportunity in employment. Similarly, labor law processes, such as collective
bargaining, have also been found to influence business practices for the better64
and could be instrumental in both clarifying workers’ rights and delineating
employers’ responsibilities under an automated hiring regime.
The Article is then organized as follows. Part I reviews the business case
for automated hiring as well as the potential for misuse of automated hiring
systems. Part II parses some solutions that focus on some of the technological
shortcomings of automated hiring systems and notes the limitations of such
techno-solutionist approaches. Part III discusses the gaps in current
employment law framework for addressing bias in automated hiring —
notably, disparate impact claims present a high hurdle for plaintiffs, especially
in the case of automated hiring systems when the means of proof is solely
under the control of the employer. Part IV examines the potential for a hybrid
approach to tackling bias in employment discrimination that combines ex post
approaches (in particular internal and external auditing mandates) with ex ante
approaches, such as 1) contractual protections for employers who rely on
vendor representations of bias reduction, 2) fairness-by-design principles that
could be implemented as part of Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) guidelines to prevent discrimination in automated hiring, and 3)
collective bargaining that would address both data input into automated hiring
systems and worker control over the afterlife of the data created by these
systems.
I. AUTOMATED HIRING AS BUSINESS PRACTICE
In this Part, I discuss the business case for the trend towards automated
hiring. I also note the potential for automated hiring systems to be misused to
produce unlawful employment discrimination. Furthermore, I describe how
such systems may serve to mask employment discrimination or impede its
detection.
A.The Business Case
Automated hiring systems have proliferated because they are perceived as
both cost-effective and efficient. A Forbes article notes that artificial
intelligence (“AI”) will quickly emerge as a key tool for human resources
(“HR”) because of the current talent scarcity and low unemployment. 65
See Alison D. Morantz, What Unions Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 515,
527–28 (2017) (surveying literature from an array of regulatory domains —
antidiscrimination, environmental protection, product quality, corporate governance, law
enforcement, tax compliance, minimum wage and overtime protection, and occupational
safety and health — to show that unions tend to increase the level of regulatory compliance).
65 Gal Almog, Recruiting Isn’t Enough: How AI Is Changing the Rules in the Human Capital Market,
FORBES (Feb. 9, 2018, 8:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2018/02/09/traditional-recruiting-isnt-enough64
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Companies on average spend approximately four thousand dollars per
candidate on the hiring process, including interviewing, scheduling, and
conducting assessments.66 However, the adoption of automated hiring makes
the hiring process much less costly. This might be why, according to a Deloitte
Bersin report, companies that use technologies, such as AI and predictive data
analytics, are more successful than those who do not. 67 For instance, one
report indicates that the companies using AI technology show 18% higher
revenue and 30% greater profitability compared to those without the tools.68
A report by Ideal demonstrates how automated hiring allows companies
to be efficient in hiring by detailing the time commitment required for
traditional hiring. 69 On average, companies spend fourteen hours per week
manually completing tasks that could be automated.70 Twenty-eight percent
indicate that they spend twenty hours or more, and 11% spend thirty hours or
more on such tasks.71 Also, 41% of HR managers say not fully automating their
manual hiring processes has led to lower productivity, and 35% have
experienced higher costs for the same reason.72 In addition to lower efficiency
and productivity, not fully automating manual processes in HR seems to have
affected hiring decisions regarding the best talent, as 17% of HR managers
state that it has led to a poor candidate experience.73
Other articles also tout the benefits of adopting automated hiring
processes. For instance, a LinkedIn Talent Blog post claims that a recruiting
algorithm increases the accuracy of selecting productive employees by more
than 50%.74 An article by Monster.com, a global employment website, boasts
that using big data to evaluate candidates has lowered turnover for companies,
how-ai-is-changing-the-rules-in-the-human-capital-market/#729e2624274a
[https://perma.cc/EXB3-XLH7].
66 See id. (citing DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, THE RISE OF THE SOCIAL ENTERPRISE:
2018 DELOITTE GLOBAL HUMAN CAPITAL TRENDS (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/gxhc-trends-rise-social-enterprise.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU3N-2QXR]).
67 See Almog, supra note 65 (citing DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, supra note 66).
68 See DENISE MOULTON & ROBIN ERICKSON, USING TALENT ACQUISITION TO DRIVE
CRITICAL TALENT RESULT 2–3 (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/human-capital/us-hcusing-talent-acquisition-to-drive-critical-talent-results.pdf [https://perma.cc/8APZ-ZGJC];
see also Almog, supra note 65.
69 Ji-A Min, 12 Revealing Stats on How Recruiters Feel About AI, IDEAL (Feb. 1, 2019),
https://ideal.com/how-recruiters-feel-about-ai/ [https://perma.cc/RLZ8-DT6L].
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 Maren Hogan, 8 Hiring Stats That Will Change the Way You Recruit, LINKEDIN: TALENT
BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016), https://business.linkedin.com/talent-solutions/blog/trends-andresearch/2016/8-hiring-stats-that-will-change-the-way-you-recruit-today
[https://perma.cc/3N4X-WEJD]; see also Roy Maurer, Using Data to Make Better Hires, SHRM
(Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/talentacquisition/pages/using-data-make-better-hires.aspx [https://perma.cc/49DA-G2PP]
(citing Nathan R. Kuncel, Deniz S. Ones & David M. Klieger, In Hiring, Algorithms Beat
Instinct, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/05/in-hiring-algorithms-beatinstinct [https://perma.cc/5Y9P-C6XD]).
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with a median reduction of 38%. 75 Furthermore, in the article In Hiring,
Algorithms Beat Instinct, the authors argue that hiring algorithms produce more
objective outcomes than do human decision-makers.76 The authors note that
although humans are adept at specifying qualifications for a job and drawing
out information from candidates, HR managers find it difficult to weigh the
results;77 according to one analysis, a simple equation performed better than
human decisions, regardless of the number of candidates and types of jobs.78
Another study found that although hiring managers can be greatly familiar with
their organizations and have more insight beyond a two-dimensional job
description, they are also easily distracted by marginal things, such as applicants’
compliments, and “use information inconsistently.”79 Yet another study found
that a job-screening algorithm “favored ‘nontraditional’ candidates” much
more than human screeners did, “exhibit[ing] significantly less bias against
candidates that were underrepresented at the firm.”80 Some other algorithmic
studies related to credit applications, criminal justice, public resource
allocations, and corporate governance all concluded that “[a]lgorithms are less
biased and more accurate than the humans they are replacing.”81
Given these results, some legal scholars have challenged the focus of legal
scholarship on the bias discovered in automated decision-making. 82 As these
scholars argue, the original intent of automated decision-making is “to
improve upon human decision-making by suppressing biases to make the most
efficient and least discriminatory decisions.” 83 Thus, arguably, there is no
implicit promise that automated decision-making could eliminate all bias;
rather, the function of automated decision-making is merely to improve upon
human decision-making. This assertion should be accepted at face value. My
purpose for this Article is not to argue that automated decision-making can or
should eliminate all bias in decision-making; rather, my aim is to argue that
automated decision-making, even when it does offer some improvement on
human decision-making, still merits legal oversight,84 particularly when such
decision-making holds the potential to limit the access to earning a livelihood
for people of protected categories.
John Rossheim, Algorithmic Hiring: Why Hire by Numbers?, MONSTER,
https://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/recruiting-hiring-advice/strategicworkforce-planning/hiring-algorithms.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MD2-4F6J].
76 See Kuncel, Ones & Klieger, supra note 74.
77 Id.
78 See id. (“Our analysis of 17 studies of applicant evaluations shows that a simple equation
outperforms human decisions by at least 25%. The effect holds in any situation with a large
number of candidates, regardless of whether the job is on the front line, in middle
management, or (yes) in the C-suite.”).
79 See id.
80 Alex P. Miller, Want Less-Biased Decisions? Use Algorithms, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 26, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/07/want-less-biased-decisions-use-algorithms
[https://perma.cc/J6YW-Y5Q9].
81 Id.
82 See, e.g., Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 520 (2018).
83 Id. at 520.
84 Professor Julie Cohen has extensively made the point that automated systems merit greater
legal oversight in her breadth of scholarship. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 7.
75
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B. How Automated Is Automated Hiring?
Although this Article uses the term “automated hiring,” I contend that this
term can be misleading as it elides the continued role of human input, the
human hand. As I have previously noted, to argue against or for automated
decision-making versus human decision-making rests on the false assumption
that the two could be wholly disentangled. 85 As Professor Mayson notes,
automated decision-making is merely a reflection of all past decisions:
All prediction functions like a mirror. . . . Algorithmic prediction
produces a precise reflection of digital data. Subjective prediction
produces a cloudy reflection of anecdotal data. But the nature of the
analysis is the same. To predict the future under status quo conditions
is simply to project history forward.86
I agree here with the conclusion that algorithmic decision-making posits
history as the best diviner of the future, but I also urge for a better
understanding of how human decision-making remains entangled in
automated decision-making. Such an understanding, I believe, would help to
quell the reification of automated decision-making as better than human
decision-making and also to negate what I call “automation exceptionalism,”
which is the idea that automated decision-making is somehow set apart and
should not be subjected to the same scrutiny or skepticism as human decisionmaking.
To illustrate this point, I point to the example of Amazon’s experience
with one hiring algorithm.87 In that case, a whistleblower revealed that Amazon
had created and then abandoned an automated hiring system that was
returning biased results for women candidates.88 I cannot believe that Amazon
would build an automated hiring system to intentionally discriminate against
women, yet that is alleged to have happened in practice.89
Most automated decision-making require human input at some stage.
Some might argue that a crucial stage is ex post, when human interveners may
choose to ignore or make exceptions for the automated result. However, note
that for all automated decision-making, there is always ex ante human input,
when human decision-making directly dictates the design of the automated
decision-making system, including deciding what variables should be
considered, and deciding how said variables should be measured. In the
Amazon case, albeit that there was no intention to discriminate, one possible
Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1711, 1718.
Mayson, supra note 4, at 2224.
87
Isobel Asher Hamilton, Amazon Built an AI Tool to Hire People but Had to Shut It
Down Because It Was Discriminating Against Women, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10, 2018,
5:47 AM), www.businessinsider.com/amazon-built-ai-to-hire-people-discriminatedagainst-women-2018- 10
88
Id.
89
Id.
85
86
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cause for the discriminatory results is human intervention in the way the
computer models were trained.90 Thus, despite some of the proven benefits
of automated hiring, there remains the potential for misuse, resulting from the
opportunities to introduce human bias at any stage of the automated hiring
process — from design, to implementation, and finally, to the interpretation
of results.
C. Potential for Misuse
Although automated hiring offers some business utility, the potential for
the misuse of algorithmic hiring to accomplish (un)intended unlawful
discriminatory results remains. Hiring technologies can play various roles in
the process; for example, in the early stages of recruiting, automated
predictions can “steer job advertisements and personalized job
recommendations to jobseekers from particular demographic groups.”91 Also,
although employers might adopt hiring technology to “increase efficiency, and
in hopes that they will find more successful – and sometimes, more diverse –
employees,” 92 this might be a superficial stop gap to addressing issues of
inequity embedded in organizational practices. Thus, the belief that recruiters
will be able to “make fairer and more holistic hiring decisions” because the
tools will “reduce bias by obscuring applicants’ sensitive characteristics,” 93
centers on individual human prejudice, while obviating institutional, structural,
and other forms of bias that become systemic in any given organization.94 To
illustrate the historical and structural nature of bias in hiring, consider this: “[A]
company that tends to hire from a privileged and homogeneous community
and then uses ‘culture fit’ as a factor in hiring decisions could end up
methodically rejecting otherwise qualified candidates who come from more
diverse backgrounds.”95
The fact remains that there are myriad ways that automated hiring could
systematically replicate biases that have calcified from organizational practice.96
90

See, Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as Anti-Bias Intervention, 41
Cardozo, L. Rev. 1671, 1674 (2020) (In which I describe the Amazon case. “A potential
cause: The computer models were trained on predominantly male resumes, with the result
that the system concluded that men were preferred candidates; thus, it “downgraded
résumés containing the word ‘women’s’ and filtered out candidates who had attended two
women-only colleges.” Id.
91 MIRANDA BOGEN & AARON RIEKE, UPTURN, HELP WANTED: AN EXAMINATION OF
HIRING ALGORITHMS, EQUITY, AND BIAS 3 (2018),
https://www.upturn.org/static/reports/2018/hiring-algorithms/files/Upturn%20-%20Help%20Wanted%20-%20An%20Exploration%20of%20Hiring%20Algorithms,%20E
quity%20and%20Bias.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY4E-FXDL].
92 Id. at 6.
93 Id. at 7.
94 For example, Professor Pauline Kim argues: “algorithms will not counteract structural
forms of workplace bias.” DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK, supra note 5, at 871.
95 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 7.
96 As other scholars have argued: “It should not be surprising that trying to predict qualities
of good future workers based on the qualities of current workers and existing work culture
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First, if the training data for a model is itself inaccurate, non-representative, or
biased, the resulting model and the predictions could reflect skewed results.97
Second, a phenomenon known as “automation bias” occurs when people
“give undue weight to the information coming through their monitors.” 98 A
third issue is when algorithms are trained to evaluate the criteria used for
selection in a manner that benefits one group of applicants. This is especially
true for automated video interviewing which is the latest trend in automated
hiring.
Automated video interviews involve the video capture of the word choices,
speech patterns, and facial expressions of job applicants which is then used to
evaluate their fit for a job position and their cultural fit within the
organization.99 A survey of 506 companies in 2011 showed that 47% use video
interviewing to shorten the hiring timeframe and save costs, and 22% would
consider it for interviewing non-local candidates.100 And more recently in 2018,
60% of organizations surveyed confirmed that they are turning to video
interviews for recruitment.101 For example, HireVue is one such technology
used to conduct virtual interviews, and the claim is that it can identify facial
expressions, vocal indications, word choice, and more.102 However, “[s]peech
recognition software can perform poorly” for certain groups of people if the
algorithms have not been trained for those groups, and “[f]acial analysis
systems can struggle to read the faces of women with darker skin.” 103 The
legitimacy of considering physical features and facial expressions as part of the
hiring process is questionable given that no scientific studies have established
any causal relationship between those attributes and workplace success.104

will not lead to change. In other words, people analytics runs the risk of homosocial
reproduction, or replacement of workers with workers that look like them, on a grand scale.”
Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia McCormack & Jintong Tang, The Law and
Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 961, 1013 (2017); see also Alan G. King & Marko
J. Mrkonich, “Big Data” and the Risk of Employment Discrimination, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 555, 574
(2016) (“[I]f incumbents are older than applicants, then the social-media profile of this older
group may differ markedly from that of younger job applicants. Accordingly, an algorithm
highly accurate in sorting incumbents for their proficiency may yield applicants notable only for
their ‘retro’ tastes and lifestyles.”).
97 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 8.
98 Id. at 9 (quoting Raja Parasuraman & Victor Riley, Humans and Automation: Use, Misuse,
Disuse, Abuse, 39 HUM. FACTORS 230 (1997)).
99 How AI Changes Recruiting Strategies Right Now, RECRUITMENT PROCESS OUTSOURCING
ASS’N (Oct. 10, 2019), https://blog.rpoassociation.org/blog/how-ai-changes-recruitingstrategies-right-now [https://perma.cc/2LCD-P8WF].
100 Heather O’Neill, Video Interviewing Cuts Costs, but Bias Worries Linger, WORKFORCE.COM
(Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewing-cuts-costs-but-biasworries-linger [https://perma.cc/GB3G-FNMQ].
101 Nilam Oswal, The Latest Recruitment Technology Trends and How to Really Use Them, PC
WORLD (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/633219/latest-recruitmenttechnology-trends-how-really-use-them/ [https://perma.cc/HQ8Q-ZNKW].
102 See BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 36.
103 Id. at 37.
104 See id. at 37–38.
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Yet, a cursory survey105 shows that a wide range of companies are already
using automated video interviewing as part of their hiring process:
1. HireVue: A pioneer in video interviewing and a platform for applicant
management, candidate assessment and video interviewing that
promises employer benefits of 24% cost savings and 25–40% time
savings.106 HireVue claims that the technology captures more than a
million meaningful data elements about a job candidate in each minute
of video and can tell managers things about candidates’ truthfulness
and confidence in answering questions. HireVue records candidates’
responses to preset questions and then analyzes and scores them based
on tone, body language, and keyword107 and criteria that are proven to
be predictive of job performance.108 This platform is mostly used by
organizations in retail, customer service, and hospitality for volume
hiring. HireVue now has more than six hundred customers and has
delivered more than five million video interviews.109
2. Talview: An AI-enabled video interviewing technology used by many
Fortune 500 companies and clients across more than 102 countries.110
Popular clients include Amazon, Cognizant, Whirlpool, and Sephora,
among others.111
3. Spark Hire: A popular video interviewing software with over 5000
customers that uses on-demand video interviews to screen job
candidates and help recruiters identify the best candidates for a job

I also shared this survey in my written testimony to Congress. See The Future of Work:
Protecting Workers’ Rights in the Digital Age, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on C.R. and Hum. Serv’s. of
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Ifeoma Ajunwa, thenAssistant Professor, Cornell University Industrial and Labor Relations School),
https://www.congress.gov/116/meeting/house/110438/witnesses/HHRG-116-ED07Wstate-AjunwaJDPhDI-20200205.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XXK-GX5E].
106 Janine Woodworth & Jake Bauer, Digital Interviewing: The Voice of the Candidate, HIREVUE 7
(2014), http://www.thetalentboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Digital-InterviewingThe-Voice-of-the-Candidate.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY2K-PJAG].
107 Dandan Chen, Pedro Galicia, Daniel Manjarrez, & Lauren Sims, The Growing Role of
Technology in Talent Acquisition, ILR SCHOOL: CURRENT ISSUES AND TRENDS IN HUMAN
RESOURCES 4 (Feb. 2018).
108 Monika, Recruiting Software — All You Need to Know, HARVER (Aug. 23, 2019),
https://harver.com/blog/recruiting-software/ [https://perma.cc/QCG2-3346].
109 Josh Bersin, AI Comes to Recruiting: Will Interviews Go the Way of the Dinosaur?, JOSH BERSIN
(Nov. 7, 2018), https://joshbersin.com/2018/11/ai-comes-to-recruiting-will-interviews-gothe-way-of-the-dinosaur/ [https://perma.cc/U873-WZWH].
110 Top 40+ Pre-Employment Assessment Tools, ACADEMY TO INVIGORATE HR (AIHR) DIGITAL
(July 2020), https://www.digitalhrtech.com/top-pre-employment-assessment-tools/
[https://perma.cc/A22R-43NP].
111 Customers, TALVIEW, https://www.talview.com/customers [https://perma.cc/KA5UA448].
105
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earlier in the hiring process. Popular clients include the United States
Postal Service, IKEA, and Volkswagen.112
4. Wepow: This technology allows employers to pre-record or schedule
live video interviews with candidates and compare and rank them
based on predefined criteria. It also analyzes the recruitment process
and highlights areas for improvement. Top customers include
Heineken, Genentech, Virgin Atlantic, Walmart, Adidas, and many
more.113
The use of automated interviewing is legally fraught for several reasons.
First, algorithms have “limited ability to parse the nuanced meaning of human
communication.” 114 Second, such checks could “surface details about an
applicant’s race, sexual identity, disability, pregnancy, or health status, which
employers should not consider during the hiring process.”115 And third, the
training of such algorithms could skew the results for protected classes given
that many software engineers are white males, and thus tend to use white male
faces and voices as their training models.116
Effective January 1, 2020, the Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act
(“AIVIA”)117 is the governing law in Illinois for any employer who chooses to
“use artificial intelligence (AI) to analyze video interview by job candidates.”118
Under AIVIA, employers are required to provide advance notice to the
applicant of the use of the video interview technology, and further to “explain
to the applicant ‘how the [AI] works’ and what general characteristics the
technology uses to evaluate applicants.” 119 This call for transparency is facially

Hear It from Our Happy Customers, SPARK HIRE, https://www.sparkhire.com/customers
[https://perma.cc/BAN5-HFWR].
113 Your Success Is Our Success . . . We Power You, WEPOW,
https://www.wepow.com/en/customers [https://perma.cc/CP4L-MAA7].
114 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 40 (quoting Natasha Duarte, Emma Llanso & Anna
Loup, Mixed Messages? The Limits of Automated Social Media Content Analysis, CTR. FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECH. 3 (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-MessagesPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPU5-294N]).
115 Id.
116 See Kari Paul, ‘Disastrous’ Lack of Diversity in AI Industry Perpetuates Bias, Study Finds,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/16/artificial-intelligence-lackdiversity-new-york-university-study [https://perma.cc/H2TN-4V32].
117 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 42 (2020).
118 Nicole Mormilo, Matthew Jedreski, K.C. Halm & Jeffrey S. Bosley, Employers Using AI in
Hiring Take Note: Illinois’ Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act Is Now in Effect, DAVIS WRIGHT
TREMAINE LLP (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-lawadvisor/2020/02/illinois-aivia-compliance [https://perma.cc/JL6E-RUQZ].
119 Matthew Jedreski, Jeffrey S. Bosley & K.C. Halm, Illinois Becomes First State to Regulate
Employers’ Use of Artificial Intelligence to Evaluate Video Interviews, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE
LLP (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.dwt.com/blogs/artificial-intelligence-lawadvisor/2019/09/illinois-becomes-first-state-to-regulate-employers
[https://perma.cc/46JD-2T32].
112
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valuable. 120 However, many AI video analytics providers do not publish
adequate information on the workings of their products. Thus, the effects of
this part of the law may take one of two paths: Either AI video providers will
be forced to publish more information about their algorithms or the standard
for meeting this transparency mandate will be effectively so low as to become
meaningless. Because this law is limited to Illinois, it is likely that the latter path
be the future course.
Beyond transparency, the law requires that employers “obtain, in advance,
the applicant’s consent to use the technology.” 121 The law also features
provisions for data protection. It imposes limits on “the distribution and
sharing of the video,” granting access “only to those persons ‘whose expertise
or technology’ is necessary to evaluate the applicant.”122 Further, candidates
are given some control over what happens to the video after their assessment.
Employers are required to “destroy the video (and all backup copies) within
30 days” of the applicant requesting its destruction.123
The law firm of Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP (“DWT”) identifies a few
key issues with the law. Chiefly, the law fails to define “artificial intelligence”
and “artificial intelligence analysis” along with other key terms. 124 This
ambiguity may mean that certain employer AI use cases, such as “to track data
about its candidates,” may not be covered. 125 Further, ambiguity in the
transparency mandate of the law may, as suggested above, pose serious
problems for its effective use. DWT notes that the law does not go in depth
to specify “how much detail an employer must provide when ‘explaining how
artificial intelligence works’ to an applicant” or what “‘characteristics’ of the
AI employers must disclose.”126 Therefore, employers may be permitted to use
broad, cursory statements such as “AI will assess a candidate’s performance”
to satisfy this requirement, statements which do not serve the true spirit of
transparency. DWT finds the law to be unclear in several other aspects as well.
It notes that there is no requirement that candidates provide express written
consent.127 Further, the law “does not include a private right of action or any
explicit penalties,” which could raise serious issues in enforcing its
provisions.128 As for data destruction, DWT points out that it is not clear if
“data that an employer extracts or derives from the video interview . . . is
subject to the destruction duty under the law.”129 If such data is not protected
by the AIVIA, then the extent to which the act allows candidates control over
their interview data is potentially limited. Lastly, DWT points out that “there
is no guidance on what it means for a job to be ‘based in’ Illinois, and the

120

See, Infra Section IIIB.
Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Mormilo, Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 122.
127 See Jedreski, Bosley & Halm, supra note 123.
128 Id.
129 Id.
121
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statute is silent as to whether employees may refuse to consider applicants who
refuse to consent.”130
Ultimately, AIVIA is a step in the right direction, as it touches on the
serious concerns of transparency and data rights. However, the primary,
overarching issue with the law is its lack of specificity. Failing to define key
terms, to expand on essential provisions, or to stipulate any enforcement
mechanism means that the effective impact of the transparency and data rights
measures is limited, and employers who wish to evade the law may do so.
Further, while some employers may surely make a good faith effort to comply,
many employers themselves are not privy to how the AI they use truly works.
Companies such as HireVue keep a close guard over their algorithms and
technologies to protect their market share, to the detriment of clients and
candidates alike.131 In order to push AI video interview companies to be more
transparent, the law must put in place effective penalties such that employers
would not choose to use technology unless AI companies provided enough
information. Effective legislation must hold enough weight to impact all
stakeholders in the AI video interview universe. Again, it is important to
reiterate that Illinois is “at the forefront of regulating technology and personal
data.”132 AIVIA should be commended as first-of-its-kind legislation that is
shedding light on critical issues of public interest. It simply needs to go further
to counterbalance the immense power which the AI sphere currently holds.
Beyond evaluation, automated hiring provides other opporutnities for
human bias to creep in. For example, as the last step of the hiring process,
employers make offers to applicants using automated hiring systems. The
software programs predict the likelihood a candidate will accept a job offer,
and what the employer can do to increase the rate of acceptance. The employer
can “adjust salary, bonus, stock options, and other benefits to see in real time
how the prediction changes.”133 Although these functions could be helpful for
an effective hiring process, they might also amplify pay gaps for women and
minority job candidates.134 Such predictive salary offers also undermine “laws
that bar employers from considering candidates’ salary histories.”135
As Rachel Goodman of the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”)
writes, the flaws of automated hiring remain because of limitations in the law.
For one, although vendors who market the hiring tools claim that these hiring
tools are less biased than humans, the software is proprietary, and there is
currently no way to verify these claims.136 This lack of transparency makes it
difficult for job applicants to bring suit based on a disparate impact theory in
“failure-to-hire” cases, as applicants are unable to identify a policy or practice
Id.
See, Infra, Section IIIB.
132 Id.
133 BOGEN & RIEKE, supra note 96, at 41.
134 See id.
135 Id.
136 Rachel Goodman, Why Amazon’s Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women, AM.
C.L. UNION (Oct. 12, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/womensrights-workplace/why-amazons-automated-hiring-tool-discriminated-against
[https://perma.cc/UW9P-QSBJ].
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that led to their rejection.137 One suggestion is that “outside auditors may be
able to uncover bias.” 138 However, such research by outside auditors is
thwarted by various obstacles, one of them being that federal laws, such as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, may criminalize certain types of testing of
employment websites for discrimination. 139 Given these obstacles, there are
calls for the EEOC to expand its efforts to govern workplace algorithms. 140
Later, I will outline some federal measures that could provide true protections
for job applicants subjected to an automated hiring regime.141 But first, I will
parse some other solutions that I think fall short of the ultimate goal of equal
opportunity for all job applicants.
II. EX MACHINA: TECHNO-SOLUTIONIST APPROACHES
Even as legal scholars have called for more transparency 142 and
accountability143 for machine learning algorithms, increasingly, attention has
shifted towards technological approaches to combating algorithmic capture in
employment. These techno-solutionist approaches generally fall into two
categories: 1) the adjustment of human job search behavior to “game” machine
learning algorithms and 2) the creation of new algorithms that promise to
eliminate bias. This section notes the limitations of such approaches and
cautions that techno-solutionist approaches will never be effective for
problems that are, at their root, derived from socio-technical interactions
arising from structural bias and societal prejudices.144
A. Humans Conform to the Machine
One approach to counteracting the biased effects of hiring algorithms is
to cheat the system. Thus, humans devise strategies to hurdle routine machine
learning errors and other encoded biases. In a recent LinkedIn article, a
Id.
Id.
139 Id.; Sandvig v. Barr — Challenge to CFAA Prohibition on Uncovering Racial Discrimination
Online, AM. C.L. UNION (May 22, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/cases/sandvig-v-barrchallenge-cfaa-prohibition-uncovering-racial-discrimination-online
[https://perma.cc/6ASQ-A2WS].
140 See Goodman, supra note 139.
141
See, Infra, Section IVB.
142 Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Access to Algorithms, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2020)
(“These features . . . have prompted calls for new mechanisms of transparency and
accountability in the age of algorithms.”); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 132 (2018) (“Such accountability
requires not perfect transparency . . . but . . . meaningful transparency.”); see Danielle Keats
Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (discussing the need for oversight of algorithms); Alyssa M. Carlson, The
Need for Transparency in the Age of Predictive Sentencing Algorithms, 103 IOWA L. REV. 303, 326
(2017) (arguing that transparency increases accuracy); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren,
Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 482 (2016)
(discussing the lack of transparency in algorithms).
143 See, e.g., Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R.
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633,
636 (2017).
144 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023, 1039 (2017).
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recruiting manager counseled job applicants on how to avoid getting axed by
the applicant tracking system (“ATS”).145 The article provides advice ranging
from appropriate file format for resumes (PDFs are difficult for hiring
algorithms to read), to the idea of choosing keywords pulled from the job
advertisement to ensure that an unsophisticated algorithm does not reject the
application simply because the algorithm was designed to only recognize a
narrow list of words provided for in a keyword search.146
In a similar vein, there are online communities dedicated to cheating the
personality tests that have now become ubiquitous features of automated
hiring.147 Although some question the reliability of personality tests,148 the tests
remain a popular part of automated hiring systems. Some experts have
estimated that “as many as 60 percent of workers are now asked to take
workplace assessments” and that “[t]he $500-million-a-year industry has
grown by about 10 percent annually in recent years.” 149 While many
organizations use personality testing for career development, about 22% use it
to evaluate job candidates, according to the results of a 2014 survey of 344
Society for Human Resource Management members.150 While some lawsuits
have sought to eliminate the tests, most workers have resigned themselves to
encountering the test as part of the hiring process and have come to rely on
online “answer keys” created to beat the tests. 151 These “answer keys,”
however, represent conformity to the unfair practices of automated hiring,
rather than a true protest of their potential to discriminate in insidious ways.
That is, efforts to cheat or beat the system merely represent the acquiescence
of humans to a regime of algorithmically derived worker selection that is
fundamentally unfair to protected categories of workers.152
B. Algorithms to the Rescue
Another technological approach is the development of new algorithmic
hiring tools that purport to eliminate biases. A recent swell of start-ups153 are
Jan Tegze, Modifying Your Resume to Beat ATS Algorithms, LINKEDIN (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/modifying-your-resume-beat-ats-algorithms-jan-tegze/
[https://perma.cc/HM2B-2VUD].
146 Id.
147 See Melanie Shebel, Unicru Personality Test Answer Key: Read This and Get Hired, TOUGH
NICKEL: FINDING JOB (May 8, 2018), https://toughnickel.com/finding-job/Unicru
[https://perma.cc/4DPV-MEAK]; Timothy Horrigan, Some Answers to Unicru Personality Test,
RE-ELECT TIMOTHY HORRIGAN 2020 (Jan. 27, 2009),
http://www.timothyhorrigan.com/documents/unicru-personality-test.answer-key.html
[https://perma.cc/72D8-LYU4].
148 See, e.g., Gill Plimmer, How to Cheat a Psychometric Test, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/eeda84e4-b4f6-11e3-9166-00144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/LDH9-7Z6Z].
149 Dori Meinert, What Do Personality Tests Really Reveal?, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT.
(June 1, 2015), https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/pages/0615personality-tests.aspx [https://perma.cc/3S6U-HZDB].
150 Id.
151 See Shebel, supra note 149.
152 See infra Section II.C.
153 See, e.g., HIREVUE, http://hirevue.com [https://perma.cc/YU54-6ZK7].
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hawking new ways to automate hiring. Some of these companies also claim
that their technological approaches ensure employment decisions that are nondiscriminatory. 154 Although these start-ups may very well have the good
intention of eliminating human bias in hiring, I argue that the lack of any
established internal or external auditing protocols means that those good
intentions cannot be verified in practice, and I remain steadfast in my belief
that any solely techno-solutionist attempts at a solution without legal oversight
will fall short.
Legal scholars have called for greater transparency for hiring algorithms, 155
with the belief that “greater disclosure of how [algorithms] operate” will help
avoid unfairness.156 Professor Frank Pasquale suggests that a solution to the
problem of algorithmic discrimination is transparency; he uses the metaphor
of the “black box” and proposes that algorithms should not operate as black
boxes but should be opened up for examination.157 However, some argue that
this call for transparency is not sufficient for algorithms to be completely fair
in regard to legal standards.158 This is because transparency alone does not fully
explain why a particular decision was made or how fairly the system operates. 159
Rather, those scholars argue that governing algorithms requires design
principles that provide checks for bias. Professor Joshua A. Kroll and his coauthors suggest technical strategies that would help overcome hidden biases in
the algorithms. 160 For instance, they suggest incorporating randomness to
maximize the gain of learning from experience; if the hiring algorithms are
random such that they hire some candidates who are not predicted to do well,
“the validity of the initial assumptions can be tested and the accuracy and
fairness of the whole system will benefit over time.”161
Professors Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst join this debate to note that
the inscrutability and the nonintuitive nature of machine learning algorithms
are both factors in automated decision-making. They define “inscrutability” as
“a situation in which the rules that govern decision-making are so complex,
Aarti Shahani, Now Algorithms Are Deciding Whom to Hire, Based on Voice, NPR: ALL TECH
CONSIDERED (Mar. 23, 2015, 4:40 PM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2015/03/23/394827451/now-algorithmsare-deciding-whom-to-hire-based-on-voice [https://perma.cc/B68N-FLWF].
155 See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 144, at 24–25.
156 AUDITING ALGORITHMS, supra note 21, at 189.
157 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Bittersweet Mysteries of Machine Learning (A Provocation), LONDON
SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI.: MEDIA POL’Y PROJECT (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2016/02/05/bittersweet-mysteries-of-machinelearning-a-provocation/ [https://perma.cc/72CC-PQTE]; see also Chander, supra note 146, at
1039.
158 See Kroll et al., supra note 145, at 633.
159 As some scholars have noted, the need for explainability is especially important in the
context of automated hiring. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann & David Westreich,
Incomprehensible Discrimination, 7 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 164, 177 (2017) (“Applicants who are
judged and found wanting deserve a better explanation than, ‘The computer said so.’”);
Andrew Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1085, 1085 (2018) (noting that “algorithmic decision-making has become synonymous
with inexplicable decision-making”).
160 See Kroll et al., supra note 145, at 640.
161 Id. at 684.
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numerous, and interdependent that they defy practical inspection and resist
comprehension.”162It is true that inscrutability can become a problem when
you have machine learning algorithms that are creating de novo rules on their
own. But the authors note that the human need to understand the intuitive
relationship between any given automated decision and the underlying data is
“not the demand for disclosure or accessible explanations; it is a demand that
decision-making rely on reasoning that comports with intuitive understanding
of the phenomenon in question,”163 I argue that this human need for “intuitive
understanding” is a desire for justice, rather than a quest for technical redress.
There is both a human need to understand the factors under which one is
judged (especially for access to livelihood) and a desire to see factors done
away with that do not conform to principles of fairness.
C. The Perils of Techno-Solutionism
In the specific case of automated hiring systems, techno-solutionist
methods fail to address the bias encoded in the business practices deployed in
the hiring process. In fact, those methods may even serve to replicate the
shortcomings of human decision-making processes in hiring. For example,
although the websites providing “answer keys” to beat employment
personality tests may help a handful of people who would otherwise have been
rejected, they also ultimately serve to reify the personality tests as part of the
job application process and to calcify the same practice as part of business
procedure for employers to screen applicants. In effect, such resistance efforts
may be futile attempts to combat “algorithmic governmentality,” which as one
scholar has argued “anticipates our every move, mapping out in advance an
apolitical ideal of behaviour and performance . . . to which the subject must
adapt and conform without reflection.”164 This suggests a need for remedies
that do not unquestioningly privilege technological innovation, but which
uphold the goals of antidiscrimination laws through careful legal oversight. As
other scholars have noted, techno-solutionist approaches to societal problems
are foiled by the “bias in, bias out” problem. 165 That is, techno-solutionist
approaches that fail to take into account structural biases encoded in the
algorithm or which fail to question the provenance of training data and how
they might bear the taint of historical inequities are doomed to replicate the
same biased results.

Selbst & Barocas, supra note 161, at 1094.
Id. at 1097.
164 Douglas Spencer, Proletarianisation Isn’t Working, RADICAL PHIL. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/reviews/individual-reviews/proletarianisation-isntworking [https://perma.cc/E3JC-9S52].
165 Mayson, supra note 4, at 2224; Robert Brauneis & Ellen Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency
for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 122 (2018); see Anjanette H. Raymond, Emma
Arrington Stone Young & Scott J. Shackelford, Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the
Market, and the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 222
(2018).
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III. DO EMPLOYMENT LAWS ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AUTOMATED
HIRING?
In this section, I discuss the limitations of employment law in protecting
job applicants who experience an adverse impact from automated hiring
systems. I review employment law scholarship that offers empirical evidence
of the difficulty of proving employment discrimination based on a disparate
impact cause of action and the theories proffered by legal scholars as to why
this might be the case. Given that the means of proving discrimination by
automated hiring systems remains solely under the control of employers, I
argue that there is a necessity for compulsory data retention by employers
making use of automated hiring systems and that furthermore such data
retention should facilitate both mandated and voluntary audits. 166 Finally, I
note the potential for trade secret law to be used as a shield against such audits,
and I argue that audits by an independent auditing body would serve to allay
any fears as to the misuse of proprietary information. These measures will aid
in data retention to help compile the statistical proof required by disparate
impact claimants, and an independent external auditing mandate would help
to maintain the intellectual property law shield for proprietary automated
systems. They will also level the field for disparate impact claimants and
eliminate the current Sisyphean climb to proving discrimination on the basis
of disparate impact.
A. The Uphill Climb for Disparate Impact Claims
As several legal scholars have demonstrated through empirical data,
plaintiffs aiming to bring an employment discrimination claim on a theory of
disparate impact, rather than disparate treatment, face an uphill battle. 167
Professor Michael Selmi assesses the disparate impact theory’s legacy.168 Based
on an extensive empirical analysis of court cases, his article employs detailed
statistics to demonstrate the difficulty of proving disparate impact cases.169 The
disparate impact theory initially arose to deal with specific practices, such as
seniority systems and written tests, that were perpetuating intentional
discrimination.170 Even though courts have not restricted the theory to those
particular contexts, it has “proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to
written examinations.”171
Selmi finds that the Supreme Court “had rejected more challenges than it
had accepted, and it had largely limited the theory to its origins — namely
testing claims and perhaps some other objective procedures capable of formal

See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 911, 989 (2005).
168 Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006).
169 See id. at 734–39.
170 See id. at 705.
171 Id.
166
167
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validation,” by the end of the first decade of disparate impact theory.172 The
following two decades further confirmed the theory’s limited reach. 173 This
limited reach is “particularly significant,” considering that employment
discrimination claims in general are already “notoriously difficult to prove.”174
Selmi notes that “if intentional discrimination is difficult to prove with existing
circumstantial evidence,” it will be even more difficult for society to accept
unintended negatives effects as racism.” 175 Based on the belief that the
disparate impact theory was a mistake, Selmi suggests that a broader judicial
definition of intent would have “opened our eyes to the persistence of
discrimination in a way that the disparate impact theory could not.”176
Similarly, Professor Sandra Sperino provides exhaustive case law evidence
of a defendant-friendly bias to the adjudication of disparate impact cases and
discusses the development of disparate impact law. 177 For example, the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. recognized the disparate impact
theory of employment discrimination under Title VII by indicating that “good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.” 178 Later, in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court “tipp[ed] the scales in favor of
employers” by “placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff and by
requiring the employer only to articulate a legitimate reason for its conduct.”179
Moreover in Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court, while recognizing that
disparate impact is a viable claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 180 “affirmed the dismissal of the
petitioners’ claims, finding that they had not produced enough evidence to
prevail on a disparate impact claim.”181 According to Justice O’Connor, the
Court in Wards Cove signaled a defendant-friendly analysis by first requiring the
plaintiff to establish that the application of a particular employment practice
created a disparate impact, then requiring the employer to produce evidence
that “its action was based on a reasonable nonage factor,” and lastly mandating
the plaintiff to bear the burden of disproving the company’s assertion.182
Sperino notes that, in reality, disparate impact claims appear to have been
disfavored even before the Smith case.183 Litigants arguing a disparate impact
case “face significant initial costs that are either absent or are less significant in
a disparate treatment case”; “the reliance on statistical evidence requires
Id. at 733.
Id. at 734.
174 See id.
175 Id. at 768.
176 Id. at 782.
177 Sandra F. Sperino, Disparate Impact or Negative Impact?: The Future of Non-Intentional
Discrimination Claims Brought by the Elderly, 13 ELDER L.J. 339 (2005).
178 Id. at 348 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
179 Id. at 349 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 673 (1989) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
180 Id. at 354 (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 228 (2005)).
181 Id. (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 242).
182 See id. at 359 (citing Smith, 544 U.S. at 252 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
183 See id. at 359–60.
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plaintiffs to obtain large amounts of data from the defendant and other
sources.”184 Furthermore, the necessary evidence required by the plaintiff “is
largely in the hands of the defendant and must be sought through the discovery
process.”185 Because defendants are often reluctant to produce the information
voluntarily, the process of collecting and analyzing statistical evidence is “both
complex and arduous.”186
Both Selmi’s and Sperino’s research offers grist for a re-imagining of
redress mechanisms for employment discrimination. First, I concur with
Selmi’s conclusions here regarding the need for a more expansive definition of
intent in proving employment discrimination cases. This is why, in another
article, I have proposed a new theory of action, discrimination per se, which takes
into account the particular difficulties of proof presented when a plaintiff is
seeking to challenge an employer’s use of an automated hiring system for
employment discrimination.187 Discrimination per se would effectively operate as
a third cause of action under Title VII.188 Per my proposal,
a plaintiff can assert that a hiring practice (for example, the use of
proxy variables in automated hiring resulting in or with the potential to
result in adverse impact to protected categories) is so egregious as to
amount to discrimination per se, and this would shift the burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the defendant (employer) to show that its practice
is non-discriminatory.189
This burden-shifting eliminates the uphill climb confronting disparate impact
claimants during which they must procure sufficient statistical evidence of
disproportionate impact.
However, even with the proposed theory of discrimination per se as help for
the plaintiff, Sperino’s point that plaintiffs of employment discrimination cases
are disadvantaged by the necessary reliance on the employer to provide the
very data they need to prove their case still stands. A major thread that runs
through the dismissed cases on automated hiring is the court’s finding of a lack
of evidence or the inability of the plaintiff to provide proof of their allegations
of discrimination.
Consider the case of Gladden v. Bolden. 190 Warren Gladden, an African
American male, filed suit against NASA alleging race and age discrimination in
violation of Title VII and ADEA. 191 He argued that the automated hiring
Id. at 360.
Id. at 360–61.
186 Id. at 361 (quoting Hill v. Miss. State Emp’t Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1990)
187 See Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1727–28.
188 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects the job applicant against discrimination
on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e17. Plaintiffs must establish that “a respondent uses a particular employment practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected characteristic] and the respondent fails
to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and
consistent with its business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
189 Ajunwa, supra note 6, at 1728.
190 Gladden v. Bolden, 802 F. Supp. 2d 209 (D.D.C. 2011).
191 Id. at 210.
184
185
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system used by NASA, Resumix, had a selection process that was
discriminatory as his resume was not moved forward in the hiring process even
though he claimed he had “extensive” experience.192 However, NASA testified
that the Resumix system did not take race, gender, or age into account when
it was analyzing and scoring resumes.193 The court thus dismissed the plaintiff’s
complaint, citing a lack of evidence.194
In yet another case, Vazirabadi v. Denver Health, 195 the plaintiff Alireza
Vazirabadi brought suit against Denver Health alleging discrimination on the
basis of age and national origin. Vazirabadi alleged that he had selected “yes”
for a voluntary question on the online application which asked if he was more
than forty years old.196 Also, another question on the online application form
asked about foreign language skills, and he had indicated that he was fluent in
Farsi. 197 Vazirabadi submitted a charge of discrimination with the EEOC
when he was not hired and the company hired a 34-year-old Caucasian and a
28-year-old Hispanic, for the two positions he had applied for.198 The court
found, however, that Vazirabadi had not provided sufficient evidence to
support his claim, and that his allegations were based “solely on conjecture.”199
Thus, the court approved the hospital’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the case.200
The difficulties of proof for applicants regarding discrimination via
automated hiring systems are further exacerbated by intellectual property law
and the CFAA.
B. Intellectual Property Law and the CFAA
Any attempt by plaintiffs to access proof of discrimination in automated
hiring systems may be stymied by extant laws, such as intellectual property law
and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), both of which have been
invoked by the makers of automated decision-making systems as shields to
scrutiny. 201 Corporations, claiming trade secret, have invoked intellectual
Id. at 211.
See Id.
194 Id. at 214–15.
195 Vazirabadi v. Denver Health & Hosp. Auth., No. 17-cv-01737, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
229111, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Oct. 11, 2018).
196 Id. at *2.
197 See id.
198 Id. at *2–3.
199 Id. at *24.
200 See id. at *25.
201 As an example of intellectual property law, section 1201 of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”) creates liability for hacking or reverse engineering an automated
system protected under copyright law. 17 U.S.C. § 1201; see also Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra
note 144, at 526 (noting the chilling effect on researchers who would like to reverse engineer
automated processes, given the potential to incur liabilities); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty,
and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1395
(2018); Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13,
192
193
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property law to prevent the disclosure of information related to their
proprietary algorithms. 202 Similarly, the CFAA has been read to protect
automated systems from outside audits with the argument that such audits
violate the terms of service for the systems. 203 Although the ACLU has
brought suit on behalf of several academic researchers aiming to audit such
systems and has alleged that the CFAA is unconstitutionally overbroad, 204
there has yet to be a proposed solution to the argument that trade secret laws
may also serve as an impediment to the auditing of decision-making
algorithms.205
Similarly, Professors Lilian Edwards and Michael Veale discuss the
concerns about the disparate impact of machine learning algorithms and the
attendant calls for transparency. 206 They claim that the argument against
opacity as “right to an explanation” under the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) is ineffective and blocks the ability for recourse.207 The
authors suggest that “subject-centric” explanations, regional based focus on
models, as explanation systems, can not only reveal more but could also
circumvent any developer’s intellectual property or trade secret concerns.208
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/opinion/how-computers-are-harmingcriminal-justice.html [https://perma.cc/BMW4-XPQ6]; Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence
of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 43 (2017) (discussing how
trade secret law can protect policing algorithms from scrutiny); Sonia Katyal, supra note 4, at
117 (discussing the same and suggesting a whistleblowing framework to enable disclosure of
biased algorithms).
202 For example, Nicole Wong, in her role as Google’s Associate General Counsel, has stated
that “Google avidly protects every aspect of its search technology from disclosure.” Nicole
Wong, Response to the DoJ Motion, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 17, 2006),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/response-to-doj-motion.html
[https://perma.cc/SC5K-72T8].
203 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Circuits have interpreted the CFAA in divergent ways. Compare
Brown Jordan Int’l, Inc. v. Carmicle, 846 F.3d 1167, 1174–75 (11th Cir. 2017), and United
States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 272 (5th Cir. 2010), and Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440
F.3d 418, 420–21 (7th Cir. 2006), and EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d
577, 582–84 (1st Cir. 2001) (adopting a broad interpretation of “exceed[ing] authorized
access”), with United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015), and United States v.
Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862–63 (9th Cir. 2012), and WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller,
687 F.3d 199, 207 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a broader interpretation). And despite its holding
in Nosal rejecting a broad interpretation of the CFAA, the Ninth Circuit recently held that
continuing to access a website after receiving a cease-and-desist letter created liability under
the CFAA. Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“But when Facebook sent the cease and desist letter, Power, as it conceded, knew that it no
longer had permission to access Facebook’s computers at all. Power, therefore, knowingly
accessed and without permission took, copied, and made use of Facebook’s data.”). The
Supreme Court recently denied Power Ventures’ petition for certiorari, Power Ventures, Inc.
v. Facebook, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017) (mem.); Power Ventures would have provided the
Court with its first opportunity to bridge the gulf between broad and narrow interpretations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
204 See Complaint at 4, Sandvig v. Lynch, No. 16-cv-01368 (D.D.C. June 29, 2016).
205 Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets, supra note 204, at 1429.
206 Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm: Why a Right to an Explanation Is
Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking for, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, 19–22 (2017).
207 Id. at 44.
208 Id. at 56–57.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437631

30
The Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems - Active Draft

I argue then, that as a pragmatic matter, while it may take time to carve out
exceptions to intellectual property law and the CFAA framework, 209 an
independent third-party auditor, that pledges to keep secret any trade secret
information it obtains in the auditing process, and which is buoyed by the labor
market preferences of job applicants, may afford a more immediate approach
to addressing the issues of transparency and accountability for automated
hiring systems. I discuss this in detail below in Section IV.B.
C. Recognizing an Affirmative Duty
I argue here that any affirmative duty of care imposed on an employer
should carry also an auditing imperative for automated hiring systems. But first:
Is there an affirmative duty of care for employers? From what legal basis is this
duty of care derived?
Over the last several decades, legal scholars have begun calling for the
application of tort law to the framework through which we understand
employment discrimination. Professor David Benjamin Oppenheimer first
noted that the Supreme Court’s primary theories of employment
discrimination could readily be analogized to intentional tort and strict liability
doctrines. 210 Then, Oppenheimer elaborates on this analogy, arguing that
employment discrimination can most aptly be compared to the tort doctrine
of negligence.211
First, Oppenheimer argues that the theory of unconscious racism must
be applied to employment discrimination. 212 Through this theory,
Oppenheimer explains that racist acts are often the product of unconscious
bias and stereotyping — not conscious decisions.213 As such, humans may not
even be aware that they are making such judgments, while their actions still
reflect their unconscious perceptions.214 Effectively, this opens the door for
people to have unconscious biases that impact others in a negative way.215
Oppenheimer then parallels this notion to the idea of employment
discrimination, arguing that employers may not consciously hold racist or
Note that one scholar advocates for exceptions to copyright law that would allow for
scrutiny of decision-making algorithms by third parties without violating the CFAA and also
allow for otherwise copyrighted material to be used as part of the training data for
algorithmic systems. Amanda Levendowki, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s
Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 594–96 (2018). My approach focuses on the idea
of a certified third-party auditor that would alleviate the concerns regarding proprietary
information, and does not necessarily require a change in existing framework — a fraught
and contentious process. See infra Section IV.
210 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 899.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 900–01.
213 Id. In fact, a person’s attempt to understand his or her relationship to the world often
necessarily means the person must categorize other individuals and draw comparisons
between himself or herself and others.213 People learn this skill from a very young age, such
that making snap judgments about others becomes part of the way their brains work Id. At
901-902
214 Id.
215 See id.
209
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discriminatory views, but nonetheless discriminate in their conduct towards
employees. 216 He observes a swift upward trend towards most white
Americans professing a commitment to nondiscrimination in employment.217
Yet, Title VII and other statutory prohibitions of race discrimination are still
necessary because racism is often an unconscious bias. 218 Furthermore,
supporting the principle of nondiscrimination in employment does not
necessarily mean that all white Americans are also in support of federal
enforcement of employment discrimination laws. 219 In fact, based on one
study, Oppenheimer suggests that 97% of the support for nondiscrimination
is an “empty gesture,” meaning white Americans often do not back up the
“support” they suggest in surveys.220 Similarly, while many white Americans
had attested that they were committed to nondiscrimination, they were
similarly more likely to describe African Americans as being more “lazy” and
less “honest” than other Americans. 221 Using these studies, Oppenheimer
concludes that white Americans are frequently unaware of their own internal
racism.222
Oppenheimer then argues that a theory of employment discrimination
that focuses on intent to discriminate can provide no remedy for most
discrimination, because there often is no intent involved. 223 The intent
requirement is ultimately based on a false binary — “[w]hen Congress enacted
Title VII it provided little guidance on the standard that courts should require
for proof of discrimination.” 224 The Supreme Court supplemented this by
dividing discrimination cases into claims that looked like intentional torts, and
others that looked more like strict liability.225
With this in mind, Oppenheimer provides an analysis of Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., a case applying the strict liability employment law theory.226 Here,
the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the “consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.”227 As such, it found that
the employer was strictly liable for its unintended but harmful conduct,
without using the words “strict liability.”228

Id.
Id. at 903.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 905.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 910.
222 Id. at 916.
223 Id.
224 Id. at 919.
225 Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (explaining that where
an employee challenges a specific employment decision, she must prove it was motivated by
an intent to discriminate); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (explaining that
where an employee challenges policies or procedures that have a discriminatory effect, she
may rely on strict liability theory rather than having to prove intentional discrimination)).
226 Id. at 920 (citing Griggs, 401 U.S.).
227 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 921 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432).
228 See id.
216
217
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Next, Oppenheimer delves into the idea of the intentional tort, which
presented itself in the McDonnell Douglas case. 229 In this case, the Supreme
Court held that in an individual discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove
an intent to discriminate by showing, for example, that “she was qualified for
an open job which remained open after her rejection.” 230 After this point,
employers can defend themselves by showing that there was a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason for their decisions.231
Yet the Supreme Court began to articulate a third approach to the adverse
impact and strict liability doctrines — the less discriminatory alternative
doctrine. 232 In these cases, a plaintiff could prevail if she could show that
“other selection devices without a similar discriminatory effect would also
serve the employer’s legitimate interest.”233 Oppenheimer argues that this test
opened the door for the application of the doctrine of negligence to
employment discrimination case.234 He explains that “[n]egligence, at its core,
is the breach of a duty recognized by law for the protection of others.” 235
Employers often have this duty — for example, the duty to provide a safe
workplace or to protect employees from unfit co-employees or supervisors.236
Then, he argues that the employment relationship is a “special relationship,”
such that both employees and employers enter into the employment
relationship with care and owe each other certain duties.237 Here, employers
could be responsible for not protecting employees from discriminatory
practices.238
The article also compares this duty to the duty to accommodate differences,
found in Teamsters, where the Court discussed the liability of failing to act.239
Though this has largely been used in the context of religious accommodations,
any employer who failed to prevent discrimination from occurring could
ostensibly be held liable. 240 In fact, after years of unsuccessful sexual
harassment claims, the EEOC began applying the liability for failure to act —
for example, in the case of workplace sexual harassment, an employer may be
responsible for the acts of non-employees, with respect to “sexual
harassment . . . in the workplace, where the employer . . . knows or should
have known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate
See id. at 922.
See id. (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
231 See id. at 922–23 (citing McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S. at 802).
232 See id. at 931.
233 See, e.g., Grant v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 635 F.2d 1007, 1015 (2d Cir. 1980).
234 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 932.
235 Id.
236 Id. (citing Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (safe
workplace); Najera v. S. Pac. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 146, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (unfit coemployees and supervisors)).
237 Id. at 932–33 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314B (1965)).
238 See id. at 933.
239 See id. at 936.
240 See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 330 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 689
(1971) (per curiam) (testing the duty to accommodate religious beliefs). Other employment
contexts in which this idea has been applied are the duty to accommodate pregnancy and the
duty to accommodate disabilities.
229
230
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corrective action.”241 Through an evolving landscape of the law, Oppenheimer
demonstrates that negligent discrimination is potentially closer to practice than
we think.
Oppenheimer’s ideas opened the door for other legal scholars to explore
the application of tort law to employment discrimination, as well as the
possibility of a duty for employers to prevent discrimination. One example of
such exploration is a 2009 article by Professor Noah D. Zatz, which
confronted the idea that employers have a duty to do more than simply
respond when employees are harassed or discriminated against by outsiders.242
To begin, Zatz explains the case of Dunn v. Washington County Hospital, in which
an employee sued her employer for sex discrimination after she made a
complaint to the hospital that an independent contractor at the hospital —
therefore, a third party — was sexually harassing her and the hospital did not
act.243 Here, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[t]he employer’s responsibility is
to provide its employees with nondiscriminatory working conditions. The
genesis of inequality matters not; what does matter is how the employer handles
the problem.”244 This notion seems to expand far beyond that of an employer’s
duty to maintain a non-discriminatory environment, extending even to actors
outside of the employer’s direct control.245
Interestingly, Zatz’s theory also rejects some long-held beliefs about
Title VII — notably that there has to be either disparate treatment or disparate
impact in order to prove discrimination, an idea which Oppenheimer had also
rejected in his analysis of Griggs and McDonnell Douglas.246 In fact, by analyzing
the treatment of third parties in discrimination cases, Zatz suggests that there
is, and should be, an entirely separate doctrine for cases of nonaccommodation, where the employer refuses to reasonably accommodate
employee’s complaints of discrimination.247 To make this point, Zatz argues
that by providing reasonable accommodations and refraining from disparate
treatment, employers can prevent “membership causation,” a phrase used to
describe when an employee suffers workplace harm due to her membership in
a protected class, regardless of where that harm comes from.248 Then, because
the employer is capable of preventing membership causation, Zatz explains
that the employer should be liable for workplace harm when it does occur. 249
Though Zatz focuses primarily on the application of this doctrine to third
parties, his message is clear — employers have a duty to prevent discrimination
in the workplace, and should be held liable when they fail to do so.
In addition to Professors Oppenheimer and Zatz, Professor Charles
Sullivan similarly finds a corollary between tort law and employment law
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2020); see also NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at
956.
242 MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at 1359.
243 Id. at 1359 (citing Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 689–90 (7th Cir. 2005)).
244 Id. (quoting Dunn, 429 F.3d at 691).
245 See id. at 1360.
246 See NEGLIGENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 919.
247 See MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at 1362.
248 See id.
249 See id. at 1364.
241
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regarding the question of imposed duties for employers. In his 2012 article,
Sullivan focuses primarily on the idea of discrimination as an intentional tort.250
The article primarily details one case, Staub v. Proctor Hospital, in which the
Supreme Court further wrote tort law into antidiscrimination statutes by
explicitly adopting tort law’s definition of intent for statutory discrimination
cases.251 However, instead of easing the notion of discriminatory intent like
many perceived Staub to do, Sullivan argues that Staub actually adds another
layer to the plaintiff’s burden.252
The plaintiff in Staub was fired by his employer because of his service
in the military, 253 which was unlawful under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act.254 Sullivan notes that Staub will
govern cases under more traditional antidiscrimination statutes, including Title
VII, as they provide similar language for antidiscrimination claims. 255 Both
statutes place the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, and will not allow
damages if the employer meets its burden of showing that it would have made
the same decision regardless of the protected characteristic.256
Analyzing the employment discrimination claim, Justice Scalia held
that if a supervisor performed an act motivated by discriminatory animus that
was “intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if
that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the
employer is liable . . . .”257 As Sullivan notes, this is the first time the language
of tortious intent had been brought directly into the employment law
context.258 Sullivan argues that this case left open many questions as to what
the employer’s actual duties are.259 For example, where Zatz had argued for
liability arising from third parties, Sullivan notes that under this intent-based
analysis, it is unclear whether an employer could even be liable for the actions
of subordinates.260 Sullivan’s analysis raises the question of how far tort law
can truly be integrated into employment discrimination law, at least without
also requiring a duty to prevent discrimination.
Professor Richard Thompson Ford similarly mulled over the question
of intent as part of employment discrimination. Ford argues precisely for how
to fill the gap that Oppenheimer had described — “abandon[ing] conceptual
disputes over ‘discrimination’ in favor of [discussing] the employer’s
affirmative duty to avoid decisions and policies that [harm] underrepresented
Charles Sullivan, Tortifying Employment Discrimination, 92 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1431 (2012)
(hereinafter Tortifying Employment Discrimination).
251 See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2009).
252 TORTIFYING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 258, at 1431–32.
253 See Staub, 562 U.S. at 411.
254 See TORTIFYING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 258, at 1435 (citing Pub. L.
No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3153 (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–35 (2006))).
255 See id. at 1435–36 (citing Staub, 562 U.S. at 417) (clarifying that both statues “declare it is
unlawful for the specified grounds to be a ‘motivating factor’ for the challenged employment
action,” among other similar language).
256 See id. at 1436.
257 Id. at 1439–40 (quoting Staub, 562 U.S. at 422).
258 See id. at 1433.
259 See id. at 1448.
260 See id.
250
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or stigmatized groups.”261 Ford begins his argument with the notion of civil
rights as the idea that we should protect individuals from potentially oppressive
states. 262 Over time, he explains, the law has gradually grown to protect
individuals not just from oppressive states but also oppressive private
institutions.263 By assigning rights to overcome these private actors, he argues
that having legal rights does not mean that an individual is specially protected
against power.264 Instead, these rights are a political decision to assign power
from one group to another.265 This is the notion that drove change throughout
the civil rights era of the American 1960s.266
Today, one of these rights is the right not to be discriminated against
in employment based on certain prohibited reasons, including race, sex,
religion, etc.267 Yet, while the law states that employers must not discriminate
on certain enumerated bases, Ford observes that the law also creates a duty of
care, though this duty has been largely undefined.268 Lacking a definition, the
bounds of an employer’s duty of care have been debated. Traditionally, the
idea has been that employers would only be liable for discrimination that they
can prevent as institutions but could not be liable for the discrimination
they — the entities themselves — did not cause.269 This means that employers
are simply encouraged to avoid decisions that undermine social equality, but
are not actually encouraged to promote social equality.270
However, even when employers have reasonable anti-harassment or
antidiscrimination policies, employees still may face harassment or
discrimination. 271 That injustice is no different for the individual simply
because the employer has an antidiscrimination policy.272 As such, Ford argues
that the law should address the outcomes openly by defining the employer’s
duty of care.273 For example, he suggests a policy change that would reward
employers who hire members of underrepresented groups, instead of making
it more “risky” to hire such people for desire to protect the company from
liability.274 Similarly, a manager who discriminates in the workplace, where the
employer has a reasonable antidiscrimination policy, has acted outside the
scope of his authority and should be liable for that action independently.275 In
effect, Ford argues for a complete overhaul of the system of antidiscrimination
RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2942.
See id. at 2946.
263 See id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (applying constitutional
standards to private entities that serve a “public function”); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (extending constitutional rights to private action)).
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id. at 2949.
267 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
268 See RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2950–51.
269 See id. at 2956.
270 See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1388.
271 See RETHINKING RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 2957.
272 See id. at 2957–58.
273 See id. at 2959.
274 See id. at 2960.
275 See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1417.
261
262
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law in favor of policy that hits at the source of the outcomes that employment
law actively tries to prevent.
Following in the footsteps of these legal scholars, I argue that in the
age of automated decision-making that we now live in, an auditing imperative
assigned to the use of automated hiring system is one way to delineate the
employer’s affirmative duty of care. This auditing imperative demands certain
actions on the part of the employers as well as the designers of automated
hiring systems. Below, I detail a hybrid approach to the redress of employment
discrimination that, although not doing away entirely with the intent
requirement, focuses on alternative means to prevent employment
discrimination, by requiring external and internal audits, mandating design
elements that allow for record keeping and data retention as the standard mode
for automated hiring, and allowing for collective bargaining by workers to set
the terms of use of automated hiring in the workplace.

IV. A HYBRID APPROACH
As described above, the problems with automated hiring go beyond the
scope of issues that could typically be addressed through litigation. Thus, any
attempts to remedy those problems must necessarily adopt a hybrid approach.
I set forth two proposed hybrid measures: 1) Mandated audits (both external
and internal, which will enable litigation) and 2) Collective bargaining, which
could serve three ends: encouraging fairness by design for automated hiring
systems by pushing for embedded data-retention mechanisms; including
probative criteria in hiring to ensure that criteria is not merely a stand-in for
class membership; and negotiating for data control and checks on data
portability to prevent the algorithmic blackballing of employees. I also address
some potential objections to these proposed measures.
The auditing of automated decision-making systems is an idea that is
gaining ground.276 This is especially true with regard to employment decisionSee AUDITING ALGORITHMS, supra note 21, at 191 (proposing the retention of audits of
automated decision-making to check for discrimination); Julie E. Cohen, The Regulatory State
in the Information Age, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 369, 372–73 (2016) (“[P]olicymakers
must devise ways of enabling regulators to evaluate algorithmically-embedded controls . . .”);
Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms and the Law, 31
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 16–17 (2017) (discussing designing algorithmic systems to enable
audits by regulators); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 144, at 24–25 (proposing that the FTC
audit consumer scoring systems); Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need
for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 169–71 (2010)
(calling for monitoring of search engines and considering the possibility of the FTC playing
that role); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 46465 (2017) (calling for greater FDA and third-party scrutiny of medical algorithms); Paul
Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response
to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1325 (1992) (calling for “independent governmental
monitoring of data processing systems”); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for
Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1312–16 (2015) (proposing that the FTC
monitor Amazon); Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Sean K. Hallisey, Equality and Privacy by Design:
276
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making, as several experts working in the field support the idea of mandated
audits for automated hiring systems. One quibble is whether such audits
should be internal or external. Meredith Whittaker, co-founder of the AI Now
Institute at New York University and founder of Google’s Open Research
group, notes that “AI is not impartial or neutral” and suggests that “in the case
of systems meant to automate candidate search and hiring, we need to ask
ourselves: What assumptions about worth, ability and potential do these
systems reflect and reproduce? Who was at the table when these assumptions
were encoded?”277 She also observes that because “systems like HireVue are
proprietary and not open to review,” there is no way to “validate their claims
of fairness and ensure they aren’t simply tech-washing and amplifying
longstanding patterns of discrimination[.]”278 Thus, she insists on the need for
audits by experts, advocacy groups, and academia.279
In response to this concern, Loren Larsen, Chief Technology Officer of
HireVue, admits that it is very important to audit the algorithms used in hiring
to identify and correct for any bias but argues that “[n]o company doing this
kind of work should depend only on a third-party firm to ensure that they are
doing this work in a responsible way . . . . [I]t is the responsibility of the
company itself to audit the algorithms as an ongoing, day-to-day process.”280

A. Internal Auditing as Corporate Social Responsibility
A federal regime of mandated internal auditing will ensure that companies
diligently review the outcomes of automated hiring and correct for any
discovered bias. On August 19, 2019, a group of 181 business executives
collaboratively working together as the Business Roundtable released a
statement in which they recognized a responsibility beyond merely satisfying
shareholders. 281 Rather, the group, which included executives from Walmart,
A New Model of Artificial Intelligence Data Transparency Via Auditing, Certification, and Safe Harbor
Regimes, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 428, 429 (2019) (proposing “an auditing regime and a
certification program, run either by a governmental body or, in the absence of such entity, by
private institutions”); see also Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward
a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 121–24 (2014) (considering
auditing by public agencies to address predictive privacy).
277 Eric Rosenbaum, Silicon Valley Is Stumped: Even A.I. Cannot Always Remove Bias from Hiring,
CNBC (May 30, 2018, 5:54 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/30/silicon-valley-isstumped-even-a-i-cannot-remove-bias-from-hiring.html [https://perma.cc/L3TY-TAK9].
278 See id.
279 See id.
280 Id.
281 The statement begins: “Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to
succeed through hard work and creativity and to lead a life of meaning and dignity. We
believe the free-market system is the best means of generating good jobs, a strong and
sustainable economy, innovation, a healthy environment and economic opportunity for all.”
Statement from Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS.
ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtableredefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans
[https://perma.cc/Q5PD-RYAY].
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Apple, Pepsi, and others, acknowledged that they must also “invest in their
employees, protect the environment and deal fairly and ethically with their
suppliers.” 282 Given this acknowledgement, I argue that internal audits to
check automated hiring systems for bias are a key part of the corporate social
responsibility (“CSR”) of business firms.
Thus, I propose that large corporations and other entities should be
required to implement a business system of regular self-audits of their hiring
outcomes to check for disparate impact. Such mandated self-audits would be
similar to the mandated self-audits of financial institutions. In an internal audit
activity, self-auditing, or self-assessment, a “department, division, team of
consultants, or other practitioner(s) [provide] independent, objective assurance
and consulting services designed to add value and improve an organization’s
operations.”283 By evaluating and improving the effectiveness of “governance,
risk management and control processes” in a systematic and disciplined way,
internal auditing helps an organization reach its objectives.284
I note here that legislation similar to the audit regime I am proposing has
been introduced by several members of the New York City Council. The
proposed legislation, filed on February 27, 2020, would make it unlawful to
sell or offer for sale in New York City an automated employment decision tool
that does not comply with the stated provisions, including a requirement that
the tool “shall be the subject of a bias audit conducted in the past year prior to
selling or offering for sale such tool.”285 “Bias audit” is defined as “an impartial
evaluation, including but not limited to testing, of an automated employment
decision tool to assess its predicted compliance with the provisions of section
8-107 and any other applicable law relating to discrimination in
employment.”286 Section 8-107 prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of “the actual or perceived age, race, creed, color, national origin, gender,
disability, marital status, partnership status, caregiver status, sexual and
reproductive health decisions, sexual orientation, uniformed service or alienage
or citizenship status . . . .”287 However, this is not a federal bill, it does not
attach to federal employment antidiscrimination law, and even if passed, it
would apply only in New York City.
During the writing of this Article, Senators Cory Booker and Ron Wyden
also proposed the Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, 288 with
Representative Yvette Clarke sponsoring an equivalent bill in the House,
David Gelles & David Yaffe Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceoscorporations.html [https://perma.cc/4ZWW-5XEE].
283 THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, INT’L STANDARDS FOR THE PROFESSIONAL
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL AUDITING 23 (2016).
284 Id.
285 Sale of Automated Employment Decision Tools, Int. No. 1894 (N.Y.C. 2020), available
at:
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4344524&GUID=B051915DA9AC-451E-81F8-6596032FA3F9&Options=ID [https://perma.cc/RJ9H-GQJK].
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019, S. 116th Cong. (2019).
282
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which comports with the auditing proposals I make here, but which I argue
are missing key elements that would allow such audits to be useful. Notably,
the proposed bill makes no mention of record-keeping or data retention
mandates for automated hiring. An audit that does not include all relevant data
will be ineffectual. Furthermore, this proposed bill is lacking a collaborative
aspect. My proposal for an “Fair Automated Hiring Mark,” which I explain in
more detail below, encourages employers to be actively invested in ensuring
that their automated hiring systems are not biased. In the questions below,
1.

Tear-off Sheets: What Information is Needed for
Verification?

Professors David Lehr and Paul Ohm note several issues with machine
learning algorithms. 289 Notably, they observe that many machine learning
algorithms suffer from the problem of “over-fitting,” which happens when “a
statistical method . . . identif[ies] as legitimate correlations due to randomness,
including outliers, in the training data — randomness that will not be the same
in the real-world data to which the algorithm is eventually applied.”290 This
presents a problem for making real-world predictions because “if certain
variables take on non-randomly extremely high or low values in the training
and test data, but not in real-world data, the rules an algorithm learns to make
predictions in the former may fail on the latter.”291 Thus, an essential part of
the internal audit check is verifying the accuracy of predictions made by the
automated hiring system.
Another issue that an internal audit should check for is inherited bias in
the automated hiring system that could have a disparate impact on protected
categories of applicants. To ask for an employer to audit whether a hiring
system has had an adverse impact on applicants who are members of a
protected class represents a paradox, as employers are typically not allowed to
collect that information at the hiring stage. Professor Ignacio Cofone notes
this paradox, and argues that the true solution is not just to regulate the “use”
of the data, but to regulate the “acquisition” of such information.292
From an auditing standpoint, however, neither the use nor the acquisition
of the information is as much a problem as the lack of such data. Thus, my
proposal is a re-design of automated hiring system to have a “tear-off sheet”
like traditional paper hiring used to have.293 This was an additional sheet that
could be torn away from all paper applications before those applications were
See David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 670 (2017).
290 Id. at 684.
291 Id. (emphasis omitted).
292 Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70 HASTINGS L.J.
1389, 1392 (2019) (emphasis omitted).
293 The EEOC noted in an informal discussion letter that “tear-off sheets” are lawful under
Title VII because of a legitimate need for the information for affirmative action purposes or
to track applicant flow. The EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Aug. 5, 2002), https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/eeoc-informaldiscussion-letter-78 [https://perma.cc/58M2-BUND].
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passed to the decision-maker. In the case of an automated hiring system, it is
a simple method of writing code wherein demographic information (such as
age, race, gender) is solicited from the job applicant but such protected
information is segregated from the rest of the electronic application, and is
embargoed, meaning decision-makers cannot access that information, until
after a hiring decision has been made. Currently, many applications do solicit
these types of demographic information, but only on a voluntary basis. This
means that many applicants may choose not to share the information. Thus,
my proposal is that provision of such information would be mandatory for
automated hiring, and that the information regarding the initial sequestration
of such information would be provided to applicants.
2.

Enhancing Applicant Selection: What Standards
Should Apply?

Standards and best practices already exist for conducting an effective
internal audit.294 As an international professional association, the Institute of
Internal Auditors (“IIA”) gives guidance on internal auditing.295 For an internal
audit to be considered effective, it should achieve ten core principles, which
include “[d]emonstrat[ing] competence and due professional care” and “[being]
insightful, proactive, and future-focused.”296 Also, as listed in the Institute’s
Code of Ethics, internal auditors are expected to uphold the following
principles: integrity, objectivity, confidentiality, and competency.297 The quality
of the internal audit activity should also be assured through internal and
external assessments, which are public reviews and day-to-day measurement,
supervision, and review of the activities and assessment by an independent
reviewer from outside of the organization, respectively. 298
One genre of organizations that follow the IIA standards comprises bank
and financial service companies.299 I have previously compared the fiduciary
duties of banks to the fiduciary duties of platforms who serve as information
fiduciaries to the job applicants, who entrust such platforms with their
personal data.300 In banks, internal audits are required not only in terms of
financial reporting, but also regarding legal compliance and general

See, e.g., id. at 1–3.
See Core Principles for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS,
https://na.theiia.org/standards-guidance/mandatory-guidance/Pages/Core-Principles-forthe-Professional-Practice-of-Internal-Auditing.aspx [https://perma.cc/7GT6-AHGY].
296 Id.
297 See Code of Ethics, INST. INTERNAL AUDITORS (Jan. 2009), https://na.theiia.org/standardsguidance/Public%20Documents/IPPF_Code_of_Ethics_01-09.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D6YK-JYE2].
298 THE INST. OF INTERNAL AUDITORS, supra note 304; Matthew Bender, BANKS & THRIFTS:
GOV’T ENFORCEMENT & RECEIVERSHIP § 5.04, 5–39 (2018).
299 Federal banking regulators suggest that the internal audit function be conducted
according to professional standards. See Michael E. Murphy, Assuring Responsible Risk
Management in Banking: The Corporate Governance Dimension, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 121, 136–37
(2011).
300 See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Genetic Testing Meets Big Data: Torts and Contract Law Issues, 75 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1225 (2014).
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effectiveness. 301 Relevant institutions have constantly emphasized the
independence of these audits. The 2001 guidelines of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, the principal agency establishing international banking
standards, states that “[a] bank’s internal audit function must be . . .
independent from the everyday internal control process.” 302 Further, the
guidance issued by a subcommittee of the Federal Reserve System emphasizes
that such internal audit must “[be] independent from the day-to-day
functioning of the bank and [have] access to all activities conducted by the
banking organization.” 303 In support of this, the manuals of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Officer of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council advocate that internal
auditors report “solely and directly” to the audit committee. 304 Given the risk
of management interference, an audit committee should consist of outside
directors, without reporting to their supervisors.305
Internal self-auditing is also conducted and recommended in other types
of industries, such as manufacturing sectors, because it helps the businesses
meet the requirements of relevant laws. For instance, an occupational safety
and health self-audit is an “assessment of workplace hazards, controls,
programs, and documents performed by a business owner or employee” in
compliance with OSHA regulations. 306 Yamin and his co-authors discuss the
significance of occupational safety and health self-audits in manufacturing
companies and suggest ideas to improve inter-rater reliability and accuracy in
the process. 307 Furthermore, OSHA allows hiring a consultant within the
company to perform self-audits when OSHA is not able to do an inspection
immediately.308
Others have noted that self-audits can enhance CSR.309 The four levels of
CSR self-audit allow companies to examine their performance in relation to ad
hoc policy, standard policy, planned policy, and evaluated and reviewed
policy.310 Furthermore, self-audits allow for strategic and operational business
planning through identification of strengths and prevention of problems.311
This genre of CSR self-audit process requires “proper training of self-auditors,
See Murphy, supra note 320, at 136.
Id. at 137 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNAL AUDIT IN BANKS
AND THE SUPERVISOR’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AUDITORS 3 (2001)).
303 Id. at 138 (citing BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, FRAMEWORK FOR
INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS IN BANKING ORGANISATIONS 20–21 (1998)).
304 See id. at 139; Gary M. Deutsch, RISK ASSESSMENTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS §
27A.03[11][c], 27A-47 (2017).
305 See Murphy, supra note 320, at 139.
306 Samuel C. Yamin, David L. Parker, Min Xi & Rodney Stanley, Self-Audit of Lockout/Tagout
in Manufacturing Workplaces: A Pilot Study, 60 AM. J. IND. MED. 504, 504 (2017).
307 Id. at 504–06.
308 See Martin v. Bally’s Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252, 1252 (1993); Olivia K.
LaBoda, Dueling Approaches to Dual Purpose Documents: The Reaches of the Work Product Doctrine
After Textron, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 727, 737 (2011).
309 See Peter Kok, Ton van der Wiele, Richard McKenna & Alan Brown, A Corporate Social
Responsibility Audit within a Quality Management Framework, 31 J. BUS. ETHICS 285, 291–93
(2001).
310 See id.
311 See Self-Audit for Quality Improvement, 18 STRATEGIC DIRECTION 5, 18 (2002).
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allocation of sufficient time to perform the audit, preparation of audit aids,
management support, and an adequate follow-up to audit findings.”312
There is a question of whether internal audits alone (or even in conjunction
with external audits) are adequate for ensuring safe harbor from
antidiscrimination laws which other scholars have addressed. 313 I, however,
maintain that internal audits can confer other benefits besides safe harbor. I
argue that rather than merely serving as a protectionist tool against
employment discrimination lawsuits, internal audits would benefit
corporations interested in diversifying their personnel. Business scholars have
shown that a workplace with diverse employees is ideal for achieving soughtafter business goals such as greater innovation. 314 Thus, the internal audits
could provide corporations with a tool to discover their blind spots in regard
to preconceived notions of qualification and fit and might even help bring
other problems of bias in hiring to the attention of the corporation. For
example, the audits could shatter misconceptions as to qualifications by
surfacing rejected candidates who nonetheless went on to become stellar
employees at other companies. Or, the audits could reveal a rather shallow
pool of diverse qualified applicants, indicating either a negative brand image
for the company, work climate problems, or the need to establish a sturdier
pipeline to the industry for diverse candidates.
D.External Auditing: The Fair Automated Hiring Mark
Given the proprietary nature of hiring algorithms, one approach that
balances intellectual property protection concerns with the need for greater
accountability is a certification system that operates on external third-party
audits by an independent certifying entity. I take as inspiration for this
proposed certification system Professors Ian Ayres and Jennifer Brown’s
framework for corporations to certify discrimination-free workplaces that
comply with the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”). 315 The
authors propose:
[B]y entering into the licensing agreement with us, an employer gains
the right (but not the obligation) to use the mark and in return
Id.
See, e.g., Pauline Kim, Safe Harbors for Algorithms? (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
314 See Katherine W. Phillips, Commentary to EARL LEWIS, NANCY CANTOR, KATHERINE
PHILLIPS & SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIVERSITY BONUS: HOW GREAT TEAMS PAY OFF IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 223, 238 (2019) (showing that diverse groups outperform
homogenous groups because of both an influx of new ideas and more careful information
processing); see also Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates Price Bubbles, 111 PROC. OF
THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 18524 (2014).
315 ENDA is legislation proposed in the United States Congress that would prohibit
discrimination in hiring and employment on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity
by employers with at least 15 employees. See generally Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination: Privatizing ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1639 (2006).
312
313

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437631

43
The Auditing Imperative for Automated Hiring Systems - Active Draft

promises to abide by the word-for-word strictures of ENDA.
Displaying the mark signals to knowing consumers and employees that
the company manufacturing the product or providing the service has
committed itself not to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.316
Other legal scholars have also proposed certification systems for
algorithms. Notably, Andrew Tutt has proposed an “FDA for algorithms,”
in which the federal government would establish an agency to oversee different
classes of algorithms to ensure that, much like food and medicine marketed
for human consumption, those algorithms would pose no harm to those over
whom they exercise decision-making power.317 And Professor Rory Van Loo
makes a compelling case for regulatory monitoring of platforms that employ
automated decision-making. 318 He defines regulatory monitoring as “the
collection of information that the [government] agency can force a business to
provide even without suspecting a particular act of wrongdoing.”319 Van Loo
notes that key factors indicating a need for regulatory monitoring include: a
public interest in preventing harm, information asymmetries, and a lack of faith
in self-regulation.320
Given that these factors are undeniably present for automated hiring, I
argue for either a government agency or a third-party non-governmental
agency as auditing and certifying authority. The governmental agency could be
under the aegis of the EEOC. Thus, the EEOC would audit and certify
automated hiring platforms before those platforms could lawfully be deployed
in the hiring process. However, given the financial and time burden such a
certifying process could exact on governmental resources, a non-governmental
entity, much like the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
(“LEED”) certification system, is a good alternative. LEED was established in
1993 “with a mission to promote sustainability-focused practices in the
building industry.”321 Thus, LEED serves as a “green certification program for
building design, construction, operations, and maintenance.” 322 The LEED
certification involves a formal certification letter, as well as plaques, signage
for buildings, and an electronic badge that may be displayed on a website.323
This third-party certification would not comprise of a one-time audit, but
rather involve periodic audits of the hiring algorithms to check for disparate
impact on vulnerable populations. Thus, this ongoing process would ensure
Id. at 1641.
See Tutt, supra note 4, at 83.
318 Rory Van Loo, The Missing Regulatory State: Monitoring Businesses in an Age of Surveillance, 72
VAND. L. REV. 1563 (2019).
319 Id. at 1574.
320 Id. at 1573.
321 Impact Conference, U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL, https://impact.usgbc.org/#about
[https://perma.cc/VSM4-JNF3].
322 Global Dow Center Earns LEED Silver Certification, FACILITY EXECUTIVE,
https://facilityexecutive.com/2020/01/global-dow-center-earns-leed-silver-certification
[https://perma.cc/B7PQ-PKCT].
323 See Congrats! You’ve Earned LEED Certification., U.S. GREEN BUILDING COUNCIL,
https://new.usgbc.org/post-certification [https://perma.cc/2RE3-HWUA].
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that the audited corporations and organizations continue to hew to fair
automated hiring practices. In return, the corporation or organization would
earn the right to use a Fair Automated Hiring Mark (“FAHM”; see illustration
of a potential mark below) for its online presence, for communication
materials, and for display on hiring advertisements to attract a more diverse
pool of applicants.

FAHM

Figure 1: The Proposed Fair Automated Hiring Mark
I envision that such a third-party certification entity would be composed
of multi-disciplinary teams of auditors comprising both lawyers and either
software engineers or data scientists who would audit the hiring algorithms
employed by corporations and organizations. This strategy would prevent
some of the tunnel-vision problems associated with technology created
without consideration for legal frameworks and broader societal goals.
Furthermore, such a certification system could serve as a feedback mechanism
and thus enable better design and best practices for automated hiring systems.
1.

The Pros and Cons of a Governmental Certifying
System

A governmental certification that is federally mandated would provide
uniformity in the practice of automated hiring and would also ensure
compliance in regard to auditing. 324 However, the issues of regulatory
capture 325 and political windshifts weigh against the adoption of a
governmental certifying system. As history has shown, governmental agencies
are vulnerable to regulatory capture,326 meaning that private influence on the
workings of such agencies, as well as political wind shifts, can render such
agencies toothless or ineffectual. While there are varying definitions of
Some legal scholars have previously argued for governmental oversight based on a
taxonomy of the distinct operations of algorithmic systems in a wide range of spheres. See
Desai & Kroll, supra note 285, at 42–55. My proposed interventions in this Article focus
solely on the employment sphere.
325 Daniel Carpenter and David Moss define “regulatory capture” as “the result or process by
which regulation, in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the
public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of
the industry itself.” DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 13 (2014).
326 See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679 (2012) (highlighting the inherent connection between the
public and private enforcement of securities laws); see also David Freeman Engstrom,
Corralling Capture, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 35–37 (2013) (arguing that the structural
conditions that facilitate regulatory capture naturally move legislatures and agencies
together).
324
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regulatory capture, “[w]hat is true, however, is that because the top officials of
federal regulatory agencies are presidential appointees, interest groups,
whether they are industries, unions, or consumer or environmental groups,
influence the regulatory agencies, and one can think of this influence as a kind
of capture.”327
Examples of regulatory capture abound in American government,
including that of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), 328
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 329 and most importantly the
EEOC.330 Most recently, an in-depth investigative report by The New Yorker
revealed the staggering extent of the regulatory capture of the FDA by Purdue
Pharma, a privately held company established by the Sackler family and which
developed the prescription painkiller OxyContin. 331 The painkiller, which is
almost twice as powerful as morphine, has been at the forefront of the current
American opioid crisis, as it was extensively marketed for long-term pain relief
despite medical evidence of its addictive properties. 332 The FDA, without
corroborating evidence from clinical trials, approved a package insert for
OxyContin that stated the drug was safer than competing painkillers — the
FDA examiner who approved the package insert, Dr. Curtis Wright, was hired
at Purdue Pharma soon after he left the FDA.333
In the employment context specifically, the EEOC, which is charged with
employment regulation, has also been susceptible to administration change.
Consider, for example, that in 2014 President Obama issued a presidential
memorandum on pay data transparency 334 instructing the Secretary of Labor
to propose a regulation mandating that federal contractors must disclose pay

CARPENTER & MOSS, supra note 346, at 54 (2014).
Other scholars have detailed a revolving door of SEC employees to and from the
financial sector and how it has contributed to regulatory capture of the SEC. See, e.g., Stewart
L. Brown, Mutual Funds and the Regulatory Capture of the SEC, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 701,
707 (2017).
329 See Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family That Built an Empire of Pain, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23,
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-anempire-of-pain [https://perma.cc/5W8K-UPK2] (discussing how a family-owned business
co-opted the FDA drug certification system through fraud and corruption).
330 Consider that the Trump administration attempted to suspend a pay data collection rule
that had been promulgated by the Obama administration to combat the gender pay gap
through transparency in pay. See Alexia Fernández Campbell, Trump Tried to Sabotage a Plan to
Close the Gender Pay Gap. A Judge Wouldn’t Have It., VOX (Apr. 26, 2019, 10:10 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/4/26/18515920/gender-pay-gap-rule-eeoc
[https://perma.cc/6PSR-JTGV].
331 Keefe, supra note 350.
332 See id.
333 See id. (detailing how OxyContin lobbied for the insert in order to increase its market
share of drug sales).
334 See Bourree Lam, Obama’s New Equal-Pay Rules, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/01/eeoc-pay-discriminationobama/433926/ [https://perma.cc/5K3Q-KZTW]; see also Press Release, The White House,
Office of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: New Steps to Advance Equal Pay on the Seventh
Anniversary of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Jan. 29, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/29/fact-sheet-new-stepsadvance-equal-pay-seventh-anniversary-lilly [https://perma.cc/29TM-V87Y].
327
328
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data broken down by race and gender to the EEOC. 335 This presidential
memorandum meant to combat gender gaps in pay.336 However, in 2017, the
Acting Chair of the EEOC, appointed by President Trump, issued a press
release announcing an immediate stay of the EEOC regulation.337
2.

The Pros and Cons of a Third-Party NonGovernmental Certifying System

A commercial third-party certifying entity with a business reputation to
protect would be much less susceptible to regulatory capture. For one, given
the voluntary nature of the relationship between the certifying entity and the
employer using automated hiring systems, there is much less of an impetus for
regulatory capture in the first place. Thus, the FAHM mark, rather than
representing a mere rubber stamp, will come to serve as a reputable market
signal for employers who are truly interested in creating a more diverse
workplace. Notably, a non-governmental entity would better withstand the
vagaries of political wind shifts like those that influenced the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”)338 and the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) regarding net neutrality339 or the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) regarding climate change.340
One argument, however, is that even independent third-party certifying
agencies are not immune to capture. As such entities will derive an economic
benefit from certifications, there is the danger that such an agency could
See Lam, supra note 355.
See Press Release, The White House, supra note 355.
337 See Danielle Paquette, The Trump Administration Just Halted This Obama-Era Rule to Shrink the
Gender Wage Gap, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2017, 2:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/08/30/the-trumpadministration-just-halted-this-obama-era-rule-to-shrink-the-gender-wage-gap/
[https://perma.cc/EMU9-YA73].
338 See Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet Privacy
Protections, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017, 7:37 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-justvoted-to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/
[https://perma.cc/LAV4-LLTE]; see also Jeff Dunn, Trump Just Killed Obama’s Internet-Privacy
Rules — Here’s What That Means for You, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:55 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fcc-privacy-rules-repeal-explained-2017-4
[https://perma.cc/VE5S-WD5N].
339 See Michael Santorelli, After Net Neutrality: The FTC Is the Sheriff of Tech Again. Is It Up to the
Task?, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2017, 11:44 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/washingtonbytes/2017/12/15/the-game-is-on-the-ftc-techregulation-post-net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/Q4MF-DZ3C] (noting the FTC’s stance
against net neutrality).
340 See Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, How Scott Pruitt Turned the EPA into One of Trump’s Most
Powerful Tools, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/under-scott-pruitt-a-year-oftumult-and-transformation-at-epa/2017/12/26/f93d1262-e017-11e7-8679a9728984779c_story.html [https://perma.cc/M7YM-UM5H]; see also Eric Lipton & Danielle
Ivory, Under Trump, EPA Has Slowed Actions Against Polluters, and Put Limits on Enforcement
Officers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/10/us/politics/pollution-epa-regulations.html
[https://perma.cc/M4FD-SUUL].
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become a mere rubber-stamping entity without adequate legal teeth to enforce
any sanctions against the entities it is certifying. However, said agency would
operate on the trust of job applicants as consumers, and the internet also
affords greater information dissemination. Thus, consumers in the form of job
applicants can now more forcefully make their voices heard regarding
algorithmic bias and could still blow the whistle341 on any misconduct, in turn
undermining any certifying mark that does not hold true.
Another valid concern regarding external auditing agencies is the privacy
of applicant data. In particular, there is a need for regulation regarding the end
uses of applicant data derived from third-party audits of automated hiring. For
one, there should be regulations prohibiting third-party vendors from selling
data derived from applicant information. In the absence of such regulation,
companies undertaking a third-party audit could enter into contractual
agreements barring the use of applicant data beyond the purposes of the audit,
including the sale or transfer of that data to other parties.
A recent audit by Hirevue may yet provide the best contrary argument
against third party auditing. In 2019, the nonprofit Electronic Privacy
Information Center lodged a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) alleging that HireVue’s use of AI to assess job candidate’s video
interviews constituted “unfair and deceptive trade practices.” 342 While
HireVue denied any wrongdoing, in 2020, HireVue announced it would cease
to include a candidate’s facial expressions in video interviews as a factor its
algorithms considered.343 On January 11, 2021, HireVue announced that it had
brought in the auditing entity, O’Neil Risk Consulting and Algorithmic
Auditing (“ORCAA”), to conduct an audit of its video interviewing system.344
The report of the audit, however, left many questions unanswered. For one,
ORCAA limited the audit to “pre-built assessments used in hiring early career
candidates, including from college campuses.” 345 This audit does not assess
what HireVue calls “custom assessments,” special algorithms which
companies may commission that “are designed around job-related outcomes
specified by the client” with the potential purpose to “predict what a
candidate’s job performance would be, were that candidate hired.” 346
See Katyal, supra note 4, at 107–08 (making a powerful argument for the importance of
whistleblowers in rectifying algorithmic bias). Other legal scholars have also made the same
argument while noting how trade secret laws might interfere with whistleblowing. See Desai
& Kroll, supra note 285, at 56–64 (2017).
342 Complaint and Request for Investigation, Injunction, and Other Relief Submitted by The
Electronic Privacy Information Center at 1, In the Matter of HireVue Inc. (2019),
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/hirevue/EPIC_FTC_HireVue_Complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G36P-2W9E].
343 Jeremy Kahn, HireVue Drops Facial Monitoring Amid A.I. Algorithm Audit, FORTUNE (Jan.
19, 2021), https://fortune.com/2021/01/19/hirevue-drops-facial-monitoring-amid-a-ialgorithm-audit/ [https://perma.cc/APC2-6B5S].
344 See Lindsey Zuloaga, Industry Leadership: New Audit Results and Decision on Visual Analysis,
HIREVUE (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hiring/industry-leadership-newaudit-results-and-decision-on-visual-analysis [https://perma.cc/3LZE-QHTB].
345 O’NEIL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, DESCRIPTION OF
ALGORITHMIC AUDIT: PRE-BUILT ASSESSMENTS 1 (2020) (on file with author).
346 Id. at 2.
341
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Ultimately, ORCAA recommended that HireVue do more to communicate to
candidates exactly what the interview process will involve and how their
answers will be screened.
Limiting the scope of the audit to “pre-built” assessments means a
potentially damning majority of HireVue use cases may have been excluded
from the purview of the audit.347 ORCAA acknowledges this reality in the audit
report, claiming “the use case we audited is not necessarily common or
representative of HireVue’s business overall” but rather supposedly reflects
what HireVue believes is a use case that “would prompt hard fairness
questions.”348 Even though an audit of custom assessments algorithms may be
more difficult to conduct because those algorithms vary in nature, many
concerns raised about HireVue center around bias replication by algorithms
that rely on job performance and hiring data from existing companies.349 This
audit does not consider such concerns. Further, the applicability of the results
of this audit to decisions about the suitability of HireVue technology as a whole
heavily depends on the significance of the pre-built assessment use case, data
on which is currently unavailable to the general public. If the pre-built
assessment use case is a minor part of HireVue’s business model, then this
audit is practically insignificant. A more meaningful audit would require
examining multiple use-case scenarios for fairness to understand the potential
discriminatory effects of the most commons ways that HireVue’s product is
deployed. The auditing report should include demographic information about
total applicants screened under each use case and any disproportionate impact on
protected categories. Despite these inadequacies, the fact that HireVue
voluntarily undertook this independent third-party audit is welcome
development in oversight of automated hiring systems. Hirevue did also
identify further investigation as to potential bias arising from the AI evaluation
of different accents and also length of responses. 350 In all, I argue that the
HireVue audit, as the first of its kind, underscores the need to create industry
standards or guidelines for third-party independent audits and, perhaps, for
governmental mandated audits conducted by a governmental agency with
standardized procedures.

While HireVue does not share details on the type and frequency of their use cases,
evidence suggests that the company is commissioned to create custom assessments by some
major clients. See Unilever + HireVue, HIREVUE, https://www.hirevue.com/casestudies/global-talent-acquisition-unilever-case-study [https://perma.cc/3N5M-5HCF]
(describing that HireVue claims its algorithms assessed “those candidates that are most likely
to be successful at Unilever,” implying that the Unilever algorithm was a custom assessment
designed to predict potential job performance at Unilever).
348 O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 313, at 2.
349
See Rachel Winters, Should Robots Be Conducting Job Interviews?, Slate (Oct. 5, 2020, 9AM),
https://slate.com/technology/2020/10/artificial-intelligence-job-interviews.html; Fin.
Times, Companies Tout 'Bullet Proof' AI Recruiting Tools, But Critics Warn They Will Replicate
Human Biases, Fin. Post: Fin. Times (June 5, 2020), https://financialpost.com/financialtimes/companies-tout-bullet-proof-ai-recruiting-tools-but-critics-warn-they-will-replicatehuman-biases; Sarah Fister Gale, Could Video Interviewing Land You in Court?, Workforce (July
1, 2019), https://www.workforce.com/news/video-interviewing-land-you-in-court.
350 O’NEILL RISK CONSULTING AND ALGORITHMIC AUDITING, supra note 313, at 4–5.
347
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This last point especially rises from the skepticism of experts regarding
internal audits. Dipayan Ghosh, a Harvard fellow and former Facebook
privacy and public policy official, has no confidence in any internal review
process given past cases of self-certifying companies revealed to be engaging
in practices that were harmful to society and certain populations.351 According
to Ghosh: “The public will have little knowledge as to whether or not the firm
really is making biased decisions if it’s only the firm itself that has access to its
decision-making algorithms to test them for discriminatory outcomes.” 352
Ghosh notes that start-ups do not face enough pressure to use third-party audit
firms because it is “not required by law,” “costs money,” and would “require
‘tremendous levels’ of compliance beyond what internal audits likely
require.”353
Given the example of regulation in other jurisdictions, where for example
the GDPR denotes algorithm audits as essential for the public good,
particularly for protecting those who are already marginalized citizens,354 or the
example of the Sarbanes Oxley-Act which mandates auditor independence and
also requires that internal officers certify financial reports quarterly, 355 I
propose that corporations employing automated hiring systems should be
mandated to engage in both internal and external audits of such systems, and I
lay out the case for each type of audit in the following sections and also discuss
the potential downfalls for each system.
E. Collective Bargaining
While internal and external audits could both enable litigation by
generating data to serve as statistical evidence of disparate impact or by
uncovering practices that could be considered discrimination per se, collective
bargaining as a collaborative exercise between employers and worker unions
could also set fair standards for automated hiring and securing applicant data.
In this section, I argue that collective bargaining provides another avenue to
check some of the deleterious effects of automated hiring. Notably, collective
bargaining could focus on the role of data collection and usage. The target of
such bargaining would be trifold: 1) agreements as to what data will be digested
by automated hiring systems; that is, setting the standards for probative
applicant assessment criteria; 2) agreements as to the end uses of such data; that
is, contractual agreements as to what the data collected will be used for, as well
as data-retention agreements; and 3) agreements as to the control and
portability of the data created by automated hiring systems.

See Rosenbaum, supra note 286.
Id.
353 Id.
354 See id. (“In recruiting – a space in which sensitive and life-changing decisions are made all
the time in which we accordingly have established strong civil rights protections – . . .
algorithmic bias [is] especially important to detect and act against.”)
355
See generally, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204 (text) (pdf), 116 Stat. 745,
enacted July 30, 2002).
351
352
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While there has been much focus on the data input required for automated
decision-making, the data generated by this decision-making process is equally
consequential, if not more so. This is because automated hiring systems hold
the potential to create indelible portraits of applicants, which may be used to
classify those individuals. 356 As a result, data submitted by an applicant is
deployed not just for one job classification or even presented to just one
employer. Rather, an applicant-data-generated worker profile may live on past
the snapshot in time when the worker applied for a specific position and may
come to haunt them during an entirely different bid for employment.357 In the
following sections, I detail the important role of collective bargaining in
achieving fair standards not only for the curation of input data, but also for
the portability of output data.
1.

Data Digested and Determining Probative
Evaluation Criteria

Arguments over standards of fairness and other approaches to algorithmic
accountability tend to neglect the role of data in perpetuating discrimination.
Yet, as several legal scholars have observed, data is not neutral; rather, it is
tainted by structural and institutional bias.358 Collective bargaining regarding
what data may be used for assessment as part of algorithmic hiring systems is
one necessary approach to curbing employment discrimination. While the
content of hiring criteria is typically not a topic of collective bargaining —
collective bargaining tends to focus on the conditions of employment for
workers who have already been hired — I argue that union leaders should not
overlook the importance of securing fair data collection and evaluation
standards for their members. There is also the argument that unions may tend
to prioritize a focus on securing good working conditions for current
employees. Yet, with the decline in union membership, securing good hiring
conditions could be a boon for unions.
The first task for unions to tackle is negotiating what data may be digested
by hiring algorithms. A crucial issue for this negotiation will be determining
what data is probative of “job fitness” or what data may even be considered
job-related. Professor Sullivan notes: “The employer’s reliance on the
algorithm may be job-related, but the algorithm itself is measuring and tracking
behavior that has no direct relationship to job performance.” 359 And while
some of the information digested by hiring algorithms may be correlated with
Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The data collected are
transformed by means of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms into a permanent electronic
resume that companies are using to track and assess current workers, and it could potentially
be shared among companies as workers move around the boundaryless workplace from job
to job.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60, at 3.
357 Id. at 3–4 (“This invisible electronic web threatens to invade worker privacy, deter
unionization, enable subtle forms of employer blackballing, exacerbate employment
discrimination, render unions ineffective, and obliterate the protections of the labor laws.”).
358 See Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency
Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 982 (2016);
see also Chander, supra note 146, at 1039.
359 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421.
356
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job success, as other scholars have noted: “If a statistical correlation were
sufficient to satisfy the defense of job-relatedness, the standard would be a
tautology rather than a meaningful legal test.”360
Rather than rely on flimsy and often irrelevant correlations excavated by
the algorithms, I concur with legal scholars who have argued that the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures361 should apply in negotiating
what data will be digested by automated hiring systems. 362 363 Although these
guidelines do not amount to law,364 they have been accorded deference in case
law 365 and have been viewed as authoritative in deciding employment
discrimination cases. 366 As Professor Sullivan notes: “While [the Uniform
Guidelines] have been used mainly for the validation of traditional paper-andpencil tests with a disparate impact , the Guidelines broadly apply to any
‘selection procedure.’” 367
The Uniform Guidelines are useful because they set standards for when
selection criteria could be considered valid. The Guidelines provide for
“three kinds of validation: criterion, content, and construct.”368 The aim of all
See DATA-DRIVEN DISCRIMINATION AT WORK, supra note 5, at 920.
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2021).
362 See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 420–22; King & Mrkonich, supra note 101, at 574.
360
361
363

SSee Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422.
The Court in Griggs concluded that the EEOC’s interpretation of the guidelines should be
given “great deference.” See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). Later
in Moody, the Court further observed that the “[g]uidelines draw upon and make reference to
professional standards of test validation established by the American Psychological
Association” and that while the guidelines were “not administrative ‘regulations’
promulgated pursuant to formal procedures established by the Congress . . . they do
constitute ‘[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing agency.’”
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430–31 (1975) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at
433–34). The Uniform Guidelines replaced the original EEOC guidelines in 1978 and it
enjoys broader consensus than the EEOC guidelines as it represents the collective view of
the EEOC and other federal agencies such as the Department of Labor, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Department of Justice. Thus, courts have similarly viewed the
Guidelines as authoritative. The court in Gulino noted: “[T]hirty-five years of using these
Guidelines makes them the primary yardstick by which we measure defendants’ attempt to
validate [a standardized certification test].” Gulino v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361,
384 (2d Cir. 2006).
366 Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422 n.106 (noting that per the results of a Lexis Advance search
on Dec. 10, 2017, “[t]he Guidelines have been cited in more than 300 cases, including a
number of Supreme Court decisions”).
367 Id. at 422 nn.107–08 (citations omitted). See, also Sullivan, supra note 14, at 422 n.108 (“29
C.F.R § 1607.3(A) (2018) (‘[T]he hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership
opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be
discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure has been
validated in accordance with these guidelines . . . .’). ‘Selection procedure’ is in turn defined
broadly to include ‘[a]ny measure, combination of measures, or procedure used as a basis for
any employment decision,’ and includes ‘the full range of assessment techniques from
traditional paper and pencil tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary
periods and physical, educational, and work experience requirements through informal or
casual interviews and unscored application forms.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Q) (2018).”).
368 Id. at 423 (citing RAMONA L. PAETZOLD & STEVEN L. WILLBORN, THE STATISTICS OF
DISCRIMINATION §§ 5.13–.17 (2d ed. 2017–2018)).
364
365
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three types of validation is to prompt the employer to provide evidence of a
predictive causal relationship between the selection method and the job
performance:
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a
criterion-related validity study should consist of empirical data
demonstrating that the selection procedure is predictive of or
significantly correlated with important elements of job performance.
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure by a
content validity study should consist of data showing that the content
of the selection procedure is representative of important aspects of
performance on the job for which the candidates are to be evaluated.
Evidence of the validity of a test or other selection procedure through
a construct validity study should consist of data showing that the
procedure measures the degree to which candidates have identifiable
characteristics which have been determined to be important in
successful performance in the job for which the candidates are to be
evaluated.369
As validation generally requires a job analysis, unions can be actively involved
in conducting the job analysis and in thus setting the standards to demonstrate
that: 1) the selection criteria for the hiring algorithm relate to important aspects
of the job, 2) the data used actually allows for a prediction of future job
performance based on the selection, and 3) the candidate selections are not the
result of some nebulous correlation but rather indicate identifiable
characteristics that are causally related to better job performance. A question
arises here as to whether unions will have the requisite technical savvy to
understand and implement these measures. This dilemma underscores the
need for greater attention to law and technology courses in law school to train
the next generation of union leaders, ensuring they remain competent to
address the next generation of workplace technologies.
But even after the determination of probative data for job fitness, there
still remains the problem of biased data. For example, data that may be
probative for job fitness, such as test scores, may still bear the taint of past
biased decisions. Consider for example that racial housing segregation has
resulted in a concentration of better-resourced schools in majority-white
neighborhoods where students who attend receive better preparation for
standardized tests. Although performance on standardized tests may be
considered probative of job fitness, the use of such a criterion could result in
disparate impact. In recognition of the historical taint of structural bias on data
that could otherwise be probative, some scholars have called for “algorithmic
affirmative action,” which focuses not merely on the design of algorithms, but
also on transparency about the biases encoded in the data and the correction
of the data used.370

369
370

Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5B (2018)) (cross references omitted in original).
See Chander, supra note 146, at 1039.
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Alternatively, employers could outright reject the use of such biased data.
For example, rather than depend on standardized testing, employers might
design video games to assess job performance qualities of applicants, such as
“social intelligence, ‘goal-orientation fluency,’ implicit learning, task-switching
ability, and conscientiousness.”371 According to David Savage and Professor
Richard Bales, these algorithms, which only identify individual personal
qualities, can reduce discrimination in evaluating job applicants. 372
Administering video games based on such algorithm in the initial hiring
process not only will decrease disparate treatment and disparate impact
discrimination because they test for individual skill sets, but they might also
reduce unconscious biases in evaluation of job candidates.373
2.

Data End Uses and Fairness by Design

One common retort to addressing bias in algorithms is that machine
learning algorithms are ungovernable; 374 however, like other legal scholars, I
argue that the adjusting the design features of hiring platforms coupled with
auditing mandates facilitate antidiscrimination ends because thus bringing
them under a rule of law. More specifically, I argue that fairness can be part of
the design of these algorithmic systems from the outset, especially for
establishing data-retention features as a standard. These machine learning
algorithms, which have the capacity to derive new models as they learn from
large datasets, are constantly reevaluating the variable inputs of calculations.
Some researchers have argued that humans could lose their agency over
algorithms given the extensive potential of algorithms for calculations and the
amount of data they use.375 To limit this reduction in choice-making power,
some have exhorted that humans need to set “checks” on algorithms, ensuring
that humans can inspect both the data that enters the system and the results
that exit. 376 By doing so, humans might reduce the chance that algorithms
would grow to be unintelligible over time. For example, IBM’s Watson
algorithm allows periodic inspections by presenting researchers with the
documents it uses to form the basis for its decisions.377

See David D. Savage & Richard Bales, Video Games in Job Interviews: Using Algorithms to
Minimize Discrimination and Unconscious Bias, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 211, 222 (2017)
(quoting Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-atwork/354681 [https://perma.cc/9792-WSKK]).
372 Id. at 224–26.
373 Id.
374 See, e.g., Kroll et al., supra note 145 (noting that some existing algorithmic systems are
largely ungovernable because they were not built with auditing in mind. They note also that
there are ways to build for auditing, but that this design logic should exist at the onset).
375 Katherine J. Strandburg, Rulemaking. and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1851, 1852 (2019)
376 Madalina Busuioc, Accountable Artificial Intelligence: Holding Algorithms to Account,
Pub. Admin. Rev. at 2 (unpublished manuscript), doi: 10.1111/puar.13293.
377 Francesca Rossi, How IBM Is Working Toward a Fairer AI,
Harv. Bus. Rev. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/11/how-ibm-is-working-toward-a-fairer-ai#.
371
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By complying with key standards of legal fairness when determining design
features, programmers can reduce discriminatory effects of hiring algorithms,
such that the algorithms avoid disparate impact for protected classes and
comply with the principles of employment antidiscrimination laws. 378
Professor MacCarthy notes that there are disputes about statistical concepts of
fairness, especially between group fairness and individual fairness, because
some believe that antidiscrimination laws aim at practices that disadvantage
certain groups, while others think these laws “target arbitrary misclassification
of individuals.” 379 Those that support group fairness measures, such as
statistical parity380 and equal group error rates, try to reduce the subordination
of disadvantaged groups by allowing for some sacrifice of accuracy. 381 As
notions of fairness diverge, organizations must choose which standard to
adopt by considering the context of use as well as normative and legal
standards.382
I argue that to achieve fairness by design for automated hiring systems, it
is also important to incorporate record-keeping and data-retention
mechanisms as part of the standard design. Determining disparate impact in
hiring algorithms is a relatively simple matter of evaluating the outcomes using
the EEOC rule.383 This rule mandates that “[a] selection rate for any race, sex,
or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with
the highest rate will generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies
as evidence of adverse impact.”384 Currently, however, job applicants who do
not make it past the hiring algorithm are typically lost to the ether.385 Thus,
there is no sure way for plaintiffs to compare relative percentages of job
applicants who were hired from protected categories against the number who
applied as required by the EEOC rule,386 and there is still no clear method to
confirm best hiring outcomes against the actual pool of qualified applicants.
As the data from automated hiring systems remains solely in the control of the
employer, appropriate record-keeping and data-retention procedures are
necessary to enable disparate impact claims.

See Mark MacCarthy, Standards of Fairness for Disparate Impact Assessment of Big Data
Algorithms, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 77–78 (2018).
379 Id. at 68. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 (2004) (providing
background for the development of competing theories on equal protection law); Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIA. L. REV. 9 (2003) (relating the history of the development and
application of two distinct antidiscrimination principles in American law).
380 Proponents of statistical parity argue that it is more desirable because it “equalizes
outcomes across protected and non-protected groups.” See Cynthia Dwork, Moritz Hardt,
Toniann Pitassi, Omer Reingold & Richard Zemel, Fairness Through Awareness, 3
INNOVATIONS IN THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. CONF. 214, 215 (2012).
381 See MacCarthy, supra note 386, at 68.
382 See MacCarthy, supra note 386, at 71.
383 See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2020).
384 Id.
385 See O’NEIL, supra note 1 at Chapter 4.
386 See 29 C.F.R. §1607.4(D) (2020).
378
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It thwarts the purpose of the EEOC rule if automated hiring systems do
not retain data when an applicant from a protected category is prevented from
completing an application or do not even retain the data of complete but
unsuccessful applications. My proposal for a legal requirement for
corporations to deploy only automated hiring systems with data-retention
mechanisms would ensure that data from failed job applicants is preserved so
that it can later be compared against that of the successful applicants, with the
aim of discovering whether the data evinces disparate impact regarding the
population of failed applicants. Although there are valid privacy concerns with
the retention of applicant data, I believe they can be addressed by embargoing
the data at the initial stage, and by a hard deletion of the data after a specified
time. There would also be steep penalties attached to re-selling the data or coopting it for end uses besides those expressly assented to by the applicants.
Responsible record-keeping and data-retention are also necessary for
conducting both internal and external audits. The data for internal audits serves
two purposes: 1) it will alert employers to any disparate impact created by the
automated hiring system, thus allowing them to preemptively correct any
imbalances and avoid costly lawsuits; and 2) it might also alert employers to
more structural issues present in their hiring. Such structural issues might
include: 1) mismatched or non-probative selection criteria; 2) a shallow hiring
pool for applicants from protected categories; and 3) technical or accessibility
problems present in the automated hiring platform. Thus, the data from
internal audits may offer a direct benefit to employers that is separate from
their duty not to discriminate.387 Such a boon should be counted in any costbenefit analysis388 of my proposed record-keeping and data-retention measures.
3.

Data Control and Portability

Earlier in the Article, I noted the vast expanse of information collected by
hiring platforms, for this section I note how the indelibility of the data profiles
created by automated hiring systems could also enable employment
discrimination. Moreover, these data profiles, some of which are created by
third-party automated hiring vendors, contain not just information provided
by the job applicant, but also data gleaned from online sources (such as social

See, e.g., BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25, at 1384 (2014) (arguing that employment law
should impose a duty of care on employers to refrain from practices that go against equal
opportunity in employment); see also Robert Post, Lecture, Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of
American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 40 (2000) (arguing that
antidiscrimination law aims to achieve positive intervention and change in social practices as
opposed to solely dictating prohibitions). Other professors have also used a “duty of care”
framework to propose remedial measures for employment discrimination. See NEGLIGENT
DISCRIMINATION, supra note 28, at 933; see also MANAGING THE MACAW, supra note 29, at
1364. I later discuss why the duty not to engage in practices that negate equal opportunity
supports my external audit proposal.
388 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Lecture, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a PseudoScientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 161 (1984) (arguing that there is a “pernicious
tendency” for cost-benefit analysis to “dwarf soft variables” in constitutional law).
387
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media profiles) and peddled by gray market data brokers.389 Therefore, such
information may include errors or could provide an inaccurate portrait of the
applicant as construed from the erroneous data. 390 Even if the information
contained in the profile is accurate, there is also the issue of “context
collapse,” 391 wherein information the applicant provided in the context of
applying for one specific job position may inappropriately be revived to
evaluate the candidate for another job position.
Given these problems, applicant control and agency over both data
collection and the portability of any created applicant profiles are crucial
matters. Thus, as part of collective bargaining, unions should negotiate with
employers regarding how applicant data will be handled. There is some tension
here between data retention for the purpose of facilitating audits and
applicants’ control of their data. But that tension is easily resolved by data
anonymization and aggregation. The relevant data for audits here is
demographic data that reveal protected characteristics. Unions can negotiate
with firms not to retain or trade in applicant profiles that contain not just
demographic data but sensitive personal information and evaluations about
applicant fitness.
4.

Preventing “Algorithmic Blackballing”

Negotiations regarding the retention of subjective applicant profiles or
evaluations are necessary to avoid what I term “algorithmic blackballing.”
When applicant profiles are allowed to live on past their shelf life, such profiles
may come to haunt the applicant in a different bid for work, whether with the

See, e.g., Web Scraping as a Valuable Instrument for Proactive Hiring, DATAHEN (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.datahen.com/web-scraping-valuable-instrument-proactive-hiring/
[https://perma.cc/2DQY-QQAY] (“What can recruiters do to use this huge advantage to
their benefit? They can scrape or crawl data off of those kind [sic] of job portals and run
analytics through it. By doing so they are able to determine the likelihood of filling a
particular position in a specified location based on historical data patterns. Everything is
relevant and important here and can impact the results of the research. Every little nuance,
like the day of the week, [sic] certain types of jobs should be posted or other kinds of factors
that will influence the decision making of the prospective candidate.”).
390 Consider the case of Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Association, where the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that defendant SARMA had created an erroneous
profile for Thompson by automatically “capturing” the incorrect social security number for
his profile and erroneously reporting the bad credit history of another man by the same
common name. Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchs. Ass’n., 682 F.2d 509, 509 (5th Cir.
1982). See also Spokeo v. Robins, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016) (holding that a “people
search engine” provided incorrect personal information about a consumer to employers, and
further that the consumer may not be able to show concrete injury).
391 Scholars have used the term “context collapse” to describe the phenomenon when
communication that is meant for one particular audience is transported to another
(dissimilar) audience without context or translation, resulting in misunderstanding or
acrimony. See, e.g., Alice E. Marwick & danah boyd, I Tweet Honestly, I Tweet Passionately: Twitter
Users, Context Collapse, and the Imagined Audience, 13 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 114, 122 (2010).
389
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same employer or, if traded, with another employer. 392 Absent any quick
federal action to regulate this, unions could have a role to play.
Consider this scenario: John applies for work through the hiring platform
of a major corporation. This platform creates profiles of all applicants. From
those profiles, the employer chooses a subset of applicants to invite for
interviews and rejects the rest. However, the hiring platform retains the
profiles of all job applicants and uses that data internally; whenever the
applicant applies again for a job, even if it is a different job from the initial
attempt, this applicant profile is revived and data from it once again becomes
the basis for a rejection. This result is unfair for various reasons. First, the
continued retention and use of applicant profiles misappropriates applicant
data — when applicants submit an application, they intend for the information
they provide to be used solely for establishing their fitness for the target job
position. It is not commonly understood that applicant data submitted at one
moment in time could once again, potentially many years later, be used as
evidence of whether an applicant is fit for another job. Second, retention and
re-use of an applicant profile deny the applicant a chance to present himself in
a manner that is more competitive for the job. For example, the applicant
could have achieved tangible assets like a new credential, or have attained less
quantifiable attributes such as better communication skills.
Further exacerbating the problem is that there are no laws prohibiting
automated hiring platforms from selling applicant data. This means that
applicant data created for one specific employer could be transported for the
use of a completely different employer. Consequently, an applicant rejected by
one employer could also, without leave to submit amendments to their profile,
continue to be rejected by multiple employers.
I term this type of exclusion “algorithmic blackballing.” The algorithmic
blackballing of applicants thwarts the goals of antidiscrimination law. While an
applicant may not be right for a specific job at a specific point in time, using
the same information that underlies that determination and applying it to a
different job, even if at the same company, is antithetical to the bedrock legal
doctrine of equal opportunity for all job applicants.
F. The Employer’s Burden
Any opposition to my proposals will largely entail economic critiques
centered on the cost to employers; however, those arguments ignore that the
overarching aim of employment antidiscrimination law is to preserve equal
opportunity for all job applicants and that antidiscrimination imposes a duty
on employers to work towards that end.393 It is true that audits cost both time
Professors Rick Bales and Katherine Stone have argued: “The electronic resume
produced by AI will accompany workers from job to job as they move around the
boundaryless workplace.” Bales & Stone, supra note 60 at 3.
393 Cf. SOLON BAROCAS & HELEN NISSENBAUM, Big Data’s End Run Around Anonymity and
Consent, in PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT
44, 44 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014) (noting that “where these data commit to record details
about human behavior, they have been perceived as a threat to fundamental values, including
everything from autonomy, to fairness, justice, due process, property, solidarity, and, perhaps
most of all, privacy”).
392
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and money, so employers could argue that mandated audits pose an undue
economic burden and would negate the cost-saving benefits of automated
hiring. However, as legal scholars like Professor Charles Sullivan have
recognized: “antidiscrimination laws do not require shareholder value
maximization. . . . The statutes do accommodate productivity concerns by
allowing neutral practices with a disparate impact to be justified by business
necessity.”394
Professor Richard Thompson Ford’s position 395 even more forcefully
supports the argument for employers to shoulder the burden of checking for
bias in algorithmic hiring systems. Ford argues that employment
discrimination law
imposes a duty of care on employers to avoid decisions that undermine
social equality...we could better improve employment discrimination
law—making it more successful as an egalitarian intervention and less
intrusive on legitimate employer prerogatives—if we abandoned
attempts to precisely define concepts such as “objective causation” and
“discriminatory intent” and instead focused on refining the employer’s duty of
care to avoid antiegalitarian employment decisions.396
If, as Ford argues, employment discrimination law already imposes a duty
of care on employers to ensure that their employment decisions are not
discriminatory, then calling for mandated audits of algorithmic hiring systems
does not impose a new burden; rather, it merely delineates exactly how that
duty of care should be fulfilled. Mandated audits are in keeping with the duty
of care to verify that employment decisions are not unlawfully discriminatory.
Moreover, self-audits need not be prohibitively costly. If, as I detail in Section
IV.C.2, the automated hiring system has already been designed in such a way
to retain and easily produce the information needed for the audits, the process
of conducting self-audits should in reality pose no added economic burden. I’ll
also note here that given that there is already a legal obligation for employers
to engage in collective bargaining, the proposals discussed here could be part
of that process and thus should not incur additional expense.
CONCLUSION
In a previous article, I detailed how automated hiring has been perceived
as a panacea for human bias in employment decision-making.397 However, as
I argued in this article, automated hiring may in actuality represent a misguided
Gordian knot approach to the systemic problem of employment
discrimination. As automated decision-making cannot be fully disentangled
from human decision-making, the former action cannot then be an antidote
for the noxious effects of the latter. The human hand, and its attendant bias,
Sullivan, supra note 14, at 398 n.12.
See BIAS IN THE AIR, supra note 25.
396 Id. (emphasis added).
397 See Ajunwa, supra note 6.
394
395
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remains present in automated decision-making. One concern then is that
automated hiring represents a Trojan horse;398 although it appears as a timeand money-saving gift to corporations inundated by a deluge of job
applications, in reality, it may conceal amplified bias and replicate unlawful
discrimination, all disguised as artificial intelligence. The problems with
automated hiring as identified elude the parameters of litigation redress
mechanisms. This is true especially when considering the onerous proof
requirements of antidiscrimination law. Thus, to enjoy any benefits of
automated hiring systems, without further exacerbating the existing problem
of bias, I advocate for a hybrid approach that deploys mechanisms from labor
law and administrative law. This first necessitates the recognition of an auditing
imperative as part of an employer’s affirmative duty of care. To fulfill such an
auditing imperative demands record-keeping and data-retention mandates,
including ex ante non-adversarial interventions, such as collective bargaining,
to set the standards for data collection. Working in tandem, these proposed
measures will get us closer as a society to the American ideal of equal
opportunity in employment.

My thanks to Professor Ryan Calo for noting this particular analogy during my paper
workshop at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference.
398
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APPENDIX
Table 1: An Evaluation of Extant Hiring Algorithms399
Automated Hiring
Platform/Software
Program

Year
Created

Companies Using
Them

Some Features

ADP Workforce Now

2009

-More than 20,000
clients by 2011

•
•

ApplicantPro

2007

-Goodwill
-JC Resorts
-New York State
Psychiatric Institute

•
•
•
•

Arya (LeoForce)

2013

???

•
•
•
•
•

Ascentis

~2007?

AssessFirst

2003

-Bel Brands USA
-BevMo!
-Calibre
-Cancún Resort Las
Vegas
-Ghirardelli
-Level 3
Communications
-LaForce
-Proficio Bank
-Voxellab
-Visit Philadelphia

•

-Air France
-Burger King
-Olympus
-Ingenico Group
-AXA
-BNP Paribas
-SMCP

•

•
•

•
•

Presents candidate data in
proprietary dashboard
“Benchmarking” insights
used to determine
compensation etc.; bills
data as “decision-quality”
Automated screening
Integrated behavioral
assessments
Integrated background
checks
Automated tracking of
compliance data
Purports to be “unbiased”
on company website
Mimics searches of
company’s most successful
recruiters
Automated sourcing
Predicts whether
candidates are likely to
move jobs
Data includes things like
“growth in the companies
they have worked for”
Advertises itself as defense
to discrimination lawsuits
and seeks to automate
EEO/OFCCP compliance
Social media integration
Can track demographic
trends in applicant
sourcing

Predicts recruiting success
with psychometrics
Can pre-select candidates
Algorithm compares job
profile to candidate profiles
to source applicants

My thanks to my research assistants, Eric Liberatore, Jane Kim, and Kayleigh Yerdon
who all contributed to this table.
399
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BALANCEtrak
(Berkshire Associates)

BirdDogHR

Breezy HR

Bullhorn

2010

2010

2014

1999

ClearCompany

2004

-Sodexo
-FCS Financial
-84 Lumber
-Baltimore City
Community College
-Atlas Copco
-Spangler Candy
-Admiral Beverage
Company
-AgChoice Farm Credit

•

-Utz
-CF Evans
Construction
-Iowa DOT
-Martin Marietta
Materials
-Optima Tax Relief
-Surgical Specialties
Corporation

•

-Shipt
-Linium
-Microsoft
-Personnel
-Docebo
-Appcues
-Telus
-Piksel
-Zapier
-Freshii
-Johnson & Johnson
-SweetIQ
-Dodge Data &
Analytics
-Knock
-T-Mobile

•

-Vet2Tech
-The Chatham Group
-Perma-Seal
-BVS Trans Tech
-Ecotech
-EXILANT
Technologies
-Medsys Group
-Adams Consulting
Group
-Apex Systems
-ALKU
-HCS Healthcare
-Allen Recruiting

•

-Borden
-MetaBank
-Goodwill
-Jackson Hospital
-Arizona Supreme
Court
-Sandhills Community
College
-PSCU Financial
Services
-Philips

•

•
•

•

•

•
•

•
•

•
•

Screening and scoring
features
Tracks jobseeker activity
Background check
integration

Automated screening and
scoring
Integrated drug testing and
background check results

Pre-recorded applicant
video interviews
Standardized guides for
interviewing and scoring
quantify (and therefore
“justify”) subjective
evaluations
Sources candidates based
on where recruiters
previously sourced
Generates EEO/OFCCP
compliance report, which
could be problematic

Predictive intelligence
suggests who to contact,
when to contact them, and
how to take action
Captures info from the
Web to source candidates
Encourages “run[ning]
your business by the
numbers”

Predictive performance
data and quality of hire
reports
Pre-recorded video
interviewing
Enables text messaging
with candidates, then
attaches those
conversations to profile
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-Edible Arrangements
-Applied Technical
Systems

•

•
•
•
•

•
CleverStaff

2014

-Kama Games
-Conscencia
-Verta Media
-Svitla Systems
-Avon
-RSM

•
•

Automates background
and reference checks; can
make authorizations less
explicit
Passive candidate sourcing
Gives current employees
referral tools
Lets users organize
applicants by any metric
Comes with automatic
“interview guides” to
suggest what should be
asked
One-click background
check
Suggests “appropriate”
candidates
Resume parsing

Comeet

2012

-Gartner
-Gett
-Fiverr
-SodaStream
-SironSource
-AppsFlyer
-Zoom
-Chegg
-Matomy Media Group
-Playbuzz
-Playtika
-Redislabs

•
•
•

Assessment analytics
App guides interviewers
Sourcing includes social
media profiles

COMPAS for Staffing

2008

-TEEMA
-Cypress
-Talener
-David Aplin Group

•
•

Assessments
Recruiting intelligence
analytics
Social integration
Automated sourcing

???

•
•

Crelate Talent

2012

•
•

•
•
Entelo

2010

-Hubspot
-Splunk
-Intel
-Wayfair
-Lyft
-PG&E
-Cisco
-United Airlines
-Netflix
-EA
-PayPal
-Sony

•
•
•
•

Detailed candidate profiles
Candidate analytics in
reports
Generates EEO/OFCCP
compliance report, which
could be problematic
Prescreening questions
Predicts best candidates
using hundreds of variables
Candidate social media
automatically available
Predicts whether currently
employed candidates are
likely to move
While it allows users to
sort candidates from
underrepresented groups
to the top, that also implies
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-Amgen
-Schneider Electric
-Slack
-Genetech
-Target
-Asana
-Northrop Grumman
-Hot Topic

a user could sort those
candidates out

Exelare

1999

-Arrow International
-Global Rhymes
-ERIMAX
-Teachers R Us
-BlueSky Technology
Partners
-Operation Homefront

•

Resume harvesting

Firefish

2010

-Nine Twenty
-Lancaster & Duke
-Purcon
-Revoco
-Avantus
-T-Impact
-Baobab Sales

•

Color-codes candidates to
rank them
Records all communication
with candidates, from text
to VOIP, for everyone in
company to use

-Tavant Technologies
-DataRPM
-Inmobi
-TATA Consultancy
Services
-TATA Power
-KPMG
-Facebook
-Nutanix
-Novopay
-Fortinet
-EFI
-LeadSquared
-Student Loan Hero
-Versa Networks
-ThoughtSpot
-Molecular
Connections
-Darkmatter

•

-Airbnb
-Evernote
-Pinterest
-Red Ventures
-Twilio
-Vimeo
-SurveyMonkey
-DocuSign
-Golden State Warriors
-Lyft
-J.D. Power

•

-Kreig Devault
-Endeavor Robotics
-Navy Army
Community Credit
Union
-Wabash Valley Power
-Bluestone Properties

•
•
•

Glider

2015

Greenhouse

HireCentric
(ExactHire)

2012

2007

•

•

•
•

•
•
•

•

AI “stack ranks”
candidates and sends
personalized messages
Auto-scores screening,
allowing people with no
technical knowledge to
evaluate performance on
technical tasks
One-way video
interviewing
Tracks if candidates
opened emails

Attempts to standardize
interviews with “interview
kits”
Tracks to generate insights
on candidates
“Data-driven hiring”
Compares company hiring
metrics to industry
standards, reinforcing
status quo
Social media integration
Screening and scoring
Integrated background
checks
Touts compliance
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-Central Restaurant
Products
HireVue

2004

-Singapore Airlines
-TJX
-Honeywell
-Intel
-Mount Sinai
-IBM
-Vodafone
-Urban Outfitters
-Under Armour
-Hilton
-Unilever
-Rackspace
-Atlanta Public Schools
-Carnival
-Boston Red Sox
-Ocean Spray
-Shipt
-Mercedes-Benz
-Maxis
-Tiffany & Co
-GEICO
-Blackbaud
-Dunkin Brands
-Cathay Pacific
-Children’s Healthcare
of Atlanta
-Oracle
-HBO
-Dow Jones
-Adventist Health
System
-Thurgood Marshall
College Fund
-Power Design
-Sequoia
-TMX Finance
-Stance
-Murphy Oil
Corporation
-CDW
-Healthsouth
-BASF
-Brigham Young
University
-CARFAX
-Church & Dwight
Co., Inc.
-Ciber
-ConocoPhillips
-Devon
-Discovery
Communications
-FranklinCovey
-Harland Clarke
-New Belgium
-Overstock
-Scotts
-Panda Express
-Qantas

•
•

•
•

•

Predictive people analytics
Uses “video intelligence”
to make automated
assessments based off
video interviews (verbal
response, intonation,
nonverbal communication,
and other data) and predict
skills, fit, and performance
Micro-facial analysis for
traits such as veracity and
trustworthiness
Acquired MindX
(psychometric games) to
further develop assessment
capabilities
Structured interviews
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-Penguin Random
House
-TJX
-Trinity Health
-WakeMed
Hyrell

2007

-City of Pittsfield (MA)
-NFSTC
-D.L. Evans Bank
-FASTSIGNS
-Primrose Schools
-National Cattlemen’s
Beef Association

•
•

Pre-scores applicants
Provides analytics on
applicants

iCIMS

1999

-Foot Locker
-Dentsu Aegis
-Dish Network
-Ketchum
-AmTrust
-Trilogy
-Gannett Fleming
-NorthStar
-Mohawk
-Southeastern Grocers
-Enterprise Holdings
-HD Supply
-Bayada
-Southwest
-Tiffany & Co.
-Rite-Aid
-Dollar General
-Lloyds Bank
-7-Eleven
-BBVA Compass
-Sony Music
-Allstate

•

Automated communication
with candidates
Recruits through social
media; applying via
Facebook means they can
access candidate’s
Facebook
Facilitates employee
referrals, reinforcing
historical hiring patterns
Screening and assessment
results

-Mashable
-Speck
-Red Bull
-GoGo Squeez
-Wedding Wire
-R/GA

•

-Telesis Corporation
-Tech Firefly
-Trantor Software
-FEV Inc.
-Essnova Solutions

•

-Cisco
-Amazon
-Korn Ferry
-Synechron
-Zoom
-Parsons
-AMN Healthcare
-Kaiser Permanente

•

JazzHR

JobDiva

Jobjet

2016

2003

2016

•

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

Like many, automates
some communication
Guided interviews
Evaluation templates with
automated scoring
Pre-screening and sorting
based on answers
Can refine by geography,
education, and “other”
Automates resume sorting
Finds personal emails and
mobile phone numbers for
candidates, even if they
didn’t apply with them
Also finds professional
history, even if not
disclosed
Uses “Big Data” to source
and qualify candidates
Brands on speed — “20x
faster”
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JobScore

2006

-Dialpad
-Bleacher Report
-Parc
-Gracenote
-Edmunds
-Hearst
-Sesame Workshop

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Jobsoid

Jobvite

Lever

2013

2006

2012

-Shift Technology
-Destinations of the
World
-The Fern Hotels &
Resorts
-VIB
-PBS Worldwide
BVBA
-Voglis Co. Ltd.
-English Lakes Hotels,
Resorts and Venues
-BiOZEEN
-Waman Hari Pethe
Jewelers
-Axtrum Solutions
-Keley Consulting

•
•

-Weight Watchers
-JCPenney
-LinkedIn
-Blizzard
Entertainment
-Education First
-Havas Group
-Universal Music
Group
-Partners in Health
-Seneca
-Trek
-Wayfair

•
•
•

-Quora
-Reddit
-Lyft
-Hot Topic
-KPMG
-Wieden + Kennedy
-Netflix
-Success Academy
Charter Schools
-Eventbrite
-Soylent
-Affirm

•
•
•

•
•

•

•
•

ROI analytics on applicant
sources
Employee referral
integration
Social media integration
Automated compliance
Standardized
interviewing/templates
Turns resumes into
weighted scores
Sorts interviewed
candidates by “thumbs
up/down” rankings
Claims to reduce hiring risk
with data that originates
with a ranked list of what
the company finds
important
Social integration
Sourcing with “advanced
intelligence”
Interview scoring
Video screening

Referral emphasis
Filters out candidates
Emphasizes time and costs
saved
One-way video for
recorded assessments

Automated sourcing
Assessments built-in
Predictions and
recommendations
Encourages fast decisions
as “data-driven”
Features to automate
nurturing top talent
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-Lowe’s
-Shopify
-Kickstarter
-UCSF Health
LinkedIn Talent
Insights

2017

-Nestlé
-Amazon
-Dropbox
-Siemens

•

•

•

Loxo

2012

Mya

2017

-Valor Partners
-Ingenium
-Contract Recruiter
-Robinson Resource
Group
-The Carolan Group
-Indigo Partners
-Dental Team Finder

•

-Adecco Group

•

•

•
•
•

Predicts candidate interest
in company/industry, how
candidates will work with
current employees, and
who would relocate
Tracks LinkedIn user
searches, connections,
follows, publications, and
likes to generate data for
recruiters
Uses factors like candidate
city or school in reports on
how to find talent
Finds personal contact info
on candidates
Automates sourcing

Automates sourcing,
screening, and scheduling
Sends data from
“conversations” directly to
ATS
Machine learning means
her interactions are based
on past candidates
Can only interact with
candidates who apply
online; thus, candidates
who apply in-person
cannot be hired

Newton

2009

???

•

Built-in EEO/OFCCP
compliance could raise
concerns

Oleeo

2018
(1995 as
WCN)

-Bank of America
-Morgan Stanley
-NBCUniversal
-WPP
-Marks & Spencer
-UK Civil Service

•

Claims to eliminate bias by
automating every step
Prescriptive hiring
recommendations
Clients can apply via social
profiles
Sorting in/out based on
skills
Auto-scoring of applicants

•
•
•
•

Olivia (Paradox)

2017

-CVS Health
-Staples
-Sprint
-Delta Air Lines
-DXC Technology
-Alorica

•

Assistive intelligence
recruiting assistant that
“talks” to interested
candidates and creates data
on them
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-Pilot Flying J

•

Machine learning means
her interactions are based
on past candidates

Oracle Taleo

2012
(Taleo
existed
before,
but
acquired
by Oracle
then)

-Western Union
-Hitachi Consulting
-Hill International
-NMDP
-Chubb
-Chicago Public
Schools
-JPMorgan Chase
-Wegmans
-Honda

•

Social media and referral
sourcing

PeopleFluent

1997

-Altair
-American Cancer
Society
-Aon
-Avaya
-Blue Cross Blue Shield
-Citrix
-Family Dollar
-Hertz
-McDonald’s
-Nationwide

•

Integrates recruiting
software with other talent
management platforms
(learning, compensation,
collaboration, etc.)
Vendor Management
Software gives control over
contingent/contract labor

-Toyota
-Avis/Budget
-Briscoe Group
-Bupa
-Calder Stewart
-Skyline
-New Zealand
Avocado
-Marra Building
Solutions
-Elms Hotel

•

-Greenpeace
-Vice
-Taco Bell
-Hotjar
-Hudson’s Bay
-Sky
-Zomato
-QWILR
-Scotch & Soda
-Lacoste
-Growth Tribe
-Arcadia

•

QJumpers

Recruitee

2006

2015

•

•

•

Automatically ranks
candidates
Will soon automate
searching for top talent

Imports passive candidates
from social media sites
Can set default reasons for
disqualification

Recruiterbox

2009

-Wolfram
-The Onion
-Makita
-Swift Capital
-Olark

•
•

Prospecting of candidates
Assessment templates

Recruiterflow

2017

-FusionCharts
-Ixigo
-Canvas Search Group
-Khosla Labs
-ParallelDots
-E2X

•

Structured interviewing
and scoring
Automated sourcing

•
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SkillSurvey

SmartRecruiters

Talenthire (CEIPAL)

2001

2010

2013

-Clemson University
-DocuSign
-Penn Medicine
-Talbots
-L.L. Bean
-Burlington Coat
Factory
-Brown-Forman
-Adidas
-Keurig
-MedOptions
-Adecco Group
-Babson
-University of
Colorado
-Randstad Sourceright

•
•

-Optimizely
-Colliers International
-Berkshire Healthcare
-Associa
-Atlassian
-Foster Farms
-FishNet Security
-Smaato
-Equinox

•

???

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
Teamtailor

TextRecruit

VidCruiter

2012

2014

2009

-Tenant & Partner
-Arken Zoo
-Notified
-SATS
-Vårdkraft
-Ingenjörer utan
gränser
-Paradox Interactive
-Servicefinder

•

-UPS
-Six Flags
-Ford
-Whole Foods
-USAA
-The Cheesecake
Factory
-Amazon
-Kindred Healthcare
-Supercuts
-VMware
-Con-way Freight

•

-Liberty Mutual
-Axiom Law
-KIPP
-University of Hawai‘i
at Mānoa
-IT Convergence

•

•

•

•

Online reference-checking
Claims predictive
technology reduces bias
Physician peer-referencing
online (unique service)
Automates tracking of
pipeline candidates

Metrics aim to focus
recruiting to historically
effective sources
Assessment tools
Measures performance and
fit
Aims to make interviewing
“objective” with scorecards
(yet this merely quantifies
subjective assessments)
Social media integration
Vendor management
integration for contingent
labor
Target sourcing
Screening questions for
applicants, sortable by
candidate answers
ROI-driven analytics
discourage innovative
recruiting

AI texting/online
messaging chatbot
performs “sentiment
analysis” to determine
candidate satisfaction
during conversations (also
does this for current
employees)
Integrates with ATS

Automates interviewing
with one-way video using
predetermined questions
Automatically ranks
candidates based on prerecorded interviews
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-Miratel Solutions
-Olameter
-Wondersitter
-UBC Sauder School of
Business
-iPacesetters
-Startx
-SilverBirch Hotels &
Resorts
-Etech
-Kellstrom Aerospace

•

•

•

•

Whozwho

Workable

Workday

Workpop

2017

2012

2005

2014

-Kids Village
-Nightowl
-Sales Coaching
International
-Simple

•

-Cognizant
-Porsche
-Ryanair
-Sears
-Sephora
-Wyndham Hotel
Group
-Upwork
-Basecamp
-Zapier
-Merrill Corporation
-Make-A-Wish
-Goodwill
-Domino’s

•

-Cannot determine
which companies
specifically use the
recruiting module of
Workday, just
companies that use any
Workday module

•

-Fresh Brothers
-The Melting Pot
-Giant Eagle
-Sprinkles
-Ashley Homestore
-WCG Hotels

•
•

•

•
•

•

•

•

•

Website advertises that it
“protect[s]” from
discrimination lawsuits by
using structured interviews
Partnered with Checkr
(background check app) to
give immediate background
check reports right in the
recruitment platform
Specifically promotes
ability to see what
candidates look like before
interviewing
Gamification of skills
testing (“engag[ing],”
“interesting”)
Attempts to use behavioral
science to determine
cultural fit
Ranks on personality, in
addition to assessments of
skills, experience, and
education
Sourcing tool aggregates
social profile data to create
candidate profiles
Facilitates employee
referrals
Structured interviews and
scorecards

Import social media
profiles
Encourages shifting of
talent spending to what
software determines is
working
Top-talent focus
Automated sourcing
Algorithm based on
millions of applications
sets starting bids for each
position on job boards
Grows applicant pool by
having applicants add coworkers as references; the
references themselves are
then in the pool
Automates rankings of
candidates with Smart
Rank
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Zoho Recruit

1996

-DreamWorks
-Manning Global
-Columbia University
School of Professional
Studies
-Tata Projects
-Urban Eats
-RBL Bank
-Sterlite Power
-GEP
-Scientific Games
-International School
of London Qatar

•
•

Social media candidate
sourcing
Allows reformatting of
parsed resumes; can delete
candidate resume
information before sharing
with rest of company
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Table 2: Strategies for Beating Automated Hiring Platforms
Method

Description

“Key Word” Usage

Look at employer’s job description and try to include in
your resume as many of the exact buzz words it uses.
Avoid synonyms — use exact language.400

Avoid Over-Complication

These systems can get confused by over-complication
(including fancy fonts, colors, and graphics), so they will
not select a resume if it contains these elements.401

Follow-Up

People are sorted out of AHPs so often that recruiters may
not know which candidates are genuinely interested and
which simply “dropped” their resumes there. If you are
genuinely interested, one of the best ways to beat the AHP
is to follow up with a recruiter via LinkedIn or other
sites.402

Relevant Keywords

Keywords are rated higher by algorithms when they appear
in a relevant paragraph (with related text), so if you can
add this to your resume in a section about your
accomplishments, you should.403

Use Free Screening Tools

Applicants can check to see how well their resume will
scan by using free sites like jobscan.com.404

Full Titles and Acronyms

Some AHPs will look for the acronym of a
title/certification (CPA, for example), while others will
look for the spelled-out form of the title (Certified Public
Accountant). Be sure to include both on your resume.405

Avoid Spelling Mistakes

Many AHPs will terminate your application immediately if
you have spelling mistakes, because they will not
understand what you’re trying to say.406

Avoid Headers and
Footers

Headers and footers will “jam” algorithms, meaning that
the algorithm will not be able to process your resume
further. Avoid these!407

See Trudy Steinfeld, Decoding the Job Search: How to Beat the ATS (Applicant Tracking System),
FORBES (May 31, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/trudysteinfeld/2016/05/31/decoding-the-job-search-howto-beat-the-ats-applicant-tracking-system/ [https://perma.cc/98L9-LQPW].
401 See id.
402 See id.
403 See How to Beat Automated Resume Screening, WORKOPOLIS (June 28, 2017),
https://careers.workopolis.com/advice/beat-automated-resume-screening/
[https://perma.cc/H28G-VH5R].
404 See id.
405 See Regina Borsellino, Beat the Robots: How to Get Your Resume Past the System & Into Human
Hands, MUSE, https://www.themuse.com/advice/beat-the-robots-how-to-get-your-resumepast-the-system-into-human-hands [https://perma.cc/NG3L-J7FC].
406 See id.
407 See Peter Cappelli, How to Get a Job? Beat the Machines, TIME (June 11, 2012),
http://business.time.com/2012/06/11/how-to-get-a-job-beat-themachines/[https://perma.cc/U8VK-XHFT].
400
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Submit Resume in Text
Format

While many people opt to send their resumes in PDF
format, this leaves the parser open to making more errors.
Typically, the easiest format for the scanner to read is in
Text Format.408

Include Postal Address

Most scanners will automatically screen out your resume if
it does not include a postal address. Just remember —
don’t include this information in a header or footer, as it
will not be screened!409

Pay Attention to Font

Avoid serif fonts (such as Times New Roman), because
some screeners reject resumes with these fonts.410

Stick to “Orthodox”
Sections

Name your sections “Work Experience” and “Education”
instead of “Career Achievements” or “Training,” because
AHPs are trained to search for specific information under
specific sections (usually, Education, Work Experience,
Skills and Contact Information).411

Apply Early

Some AHPs charge employers by the applicant, so it’s
cheaper for companies to review the first 50 applicants
than to review every applicant who applies. Thus, late
applicants are sometimes discarded without even being
screened.412

Be Average on Personality
Tests

“Score somewhere between the 40th and 60th percentiles”
and “try to answer as if you were like everybody else is
supposed to be.” Basically, try to answer questions in the
most average way possible.413

See id.
See Pamela Skillings, How to Get the Applicant Tracking System to Pick Your Resume, BIG
INTERVIEW (Mar. 2015), https://biginterview.com/blog/2015/03/applicant-trackingsystem.html [https://perma.cc/YB9D-MWDW].
410 See Melanie Pinola, Format Your Resume So It Gets Past Applicant Screening Software,
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When Asked for Word
Associations…

“When asked for word associations or comments about
the world, give the most conventional, run-of-the-mill,
pedestrian answer possible.”414

Incline to Conservatism

When asked about your values on personality tests, read
closely through all questions to look for patterns. In some
tests, the “right” or “most conservative” answers will be
located in the same multiple-choice position for each
question.415

When it Comes to
Hypothetical Judgment
Questions, Don’t Reflect

Many personality tests include hypothetical situations that
are followed by questions about how the respondent
would act if faced with that scenario. Research has shown
that it is best not to reflect on the question before
answering, and that respondents should answer as quickly
as they can to avoid giving off the sense that they are
confused about what steps they would take.416

Add Buzz Words in White
Ink

To “trick” the algorithm into sorting you through, some
applicants have suggested including more buzz words
throughout their resumes, but in white ink so that they are
not visible to the human eye. Thus, their application will
be automatically screened into the “yes” pile without
having to awkwardly force buzz words into their
documents.417
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